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INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, it has become well accepted that the
mediation process does not follow a single, uniform approach. Although that
may once have been the case, the mediation field today is composed of
practitioners following recognizably different approaches to practice-with
different views of the goals, appropriate methods, and underlying
assumptions of the practice of mediation.' Two widely used and discussed
approaches or models of mediation are known as the "facilitative" and
"transformative" models. 2 While some have claimed that talented mediators
can (and should) combine the two in serving their clients; others have argued
that combining these approaches is practically difficult if not impossible, as
well as conceptually incoherent. That is, the two models operate on such
different foundations, and with such divergent methods, that no mediator can
competently "integrate" the two or switch from one to the other as
circumstances require. Rather, principled mediators must, and do, choose an
approach to practice, either facilitative or transformative, and then offer their
clients the very best enactment of that model that their training and
experience allows. Alternatively, whether or not they do this consciously and
intentionally, the vast majority of mediators gravitate to one or the other of
these models in actual practice. In effect, most mediators can fairly be
described as following the facilitative or the transformative model-one or
the other, but not really a combination of both.4

ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT, 99-101 (2d ed. 2005); JAMES J. ALFINI ET
AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 140 (2001); Grace D'Alo, Accountability in

Special EducationMediation, 8 HARV. NEG. L. REv. 201, 205 (2003).
2 See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 1, at 169; ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS:

CASES AND COMMENTARIES 19-25 (2011); Robert A. Baruch Bush, One Size Does Not
Fit All: A PluralisticApproach to Mediator Performance Testing and Quality Assurance,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 965, 981-84 (2004). Other recognized models include
"evaluative mediation" and "narrative mediation." See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 1;
WALDMAN, supra note 2. This Article does not address those models.
3 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 1, at 228-32. See also Dorothy J. Della Noce et
al., Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinningsof Mediation: Implicationsfor Practice
andPolicy, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. J. 39, 59-60 (2002).
4 Susan Oberman, Book Review: Mediation Ethics Edited Ellen Waldman, in
ACRESOLUTION 24, 24 (Fall 2012). See also Della Noce et al., supra note 3. But
see, e.g., Michael Williams, Can't I Get No Satisfaction? Thoughts on "The
Promise ofMediation, " 15 MEDIATION Q. 143 (1997) (arguing that good mediation
can and should include both facilitative and transformative practices).
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If this is so, a problem is posed for the regulation of mediators
through codes or standards of ethics-one of the major tools of professional
regulation. The problem is that any single or unitary code of practice is
unlikely to be capable of coherently regulating the conduct of both
facilitative and transformative mediators. If a single code attempts to do so, it
is likely to fall prey to one or the other of two fatal mistakes: either it will
wind up being "exclusive," adopting provisions that make sense as
5
regulatory principles for only one of the two models of mediation; or it will
end up being overly "inclusive," adopting provisions of a general and
6
malleable character in order to "reach" both models. The first error results in
favoring one model of practice and delegitimizing the other; the second error
results in a code under which almost any practice can be justified, which is
thus of little value for either regulation or ethical guidance.
The best solution to this problem in ethical regulation is to recognize
the pluralistic character of mediation practice and to respond with a
pluralistic approach to ethical regulation. That is, mediators following
different models of practice should be governed by different ethics codes
designed to hold them accountable to the principles of their specific mode of
practice. In this way mediator ethics regulation would follow a pluralistic
approach that requires mediators to "declare" their model of practice, and
then be held accountable to standards designed specifically for that model.
The benefit of this approach is that mediators will receive clear and coherent
guidance in resolving difficult dilemmas faced in practice, and clients will
receive services that conform to their expectations and deliver high quality
and consistent professional help.
This argument for a pluralistic approach to mediator ethics is
explored, in this Article, in the context of a hypothetical case involving a
classic dilemma faced by mediators in practice. The specifics of this
hypothetical will allow for the examination of how two different codes of
ethics, both currently used in the field, would advise a mediator to handle the
dilemma presented. That examination will show that neither code alone is
sufficient to guide and regulate both facilitative and transformative
mediators. After this analysis, the Article examines several other ethical
codes to show that this problem is common and then proposes a solution that
would address the problem by enacting a pluralistic framework for mediator
ethics.

See infra notes 101-36 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 137-75 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 176-217 and accompanying text.
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A HYPOTHETICAL DILEMMA: THE CASE OF JOSE, LILLY... AND
RAFAELA

A. The Case
Jose and Lilly, both in their early thirties, had been married for
twelve years when the personal, cultural, and religious differences between
them became too great to resolve.8 They started with a blazing romance and
lovely wedding. Lilly was the daughter of "hippie" parents who grew up in
the '60s and raised their daughter with a philosophy of loving, trusting, and
sharing with everyone. In fact, Lilly was born in a "commune" where she
and her parents shared living space with several other couples and unmarried
friends. Lilly's own path as an adult was a good deal more conventional than
her parents', but she still found traditional social values pretty ridiculous. She
would agree to marry Jose in a religious ceremony only because it meant
something to his parents, but they agreed that they would not give the
Catholic religion of his parents any place in their life together-it was his
Latin passion that she loved, not the highly restrictive traditional culture of
past generations. On his side, Jose had indeed grown up in a traditional,
religious, Catholic Hispanic family, but he rebelled when he went to college.
By the time he met Lilly, he considered his background a burden and saw in
her the new free outlook on life he really wanted for his own family. (They
married in a civil ceremony, since Lilly was not Catholic or even religious at

all.)
Their first few years of married life were bliss for both of them. But
once their daughter Rafaela was born, and named for Jose's grandmother
whom he remembered fondly, that changed. Jose found himself longing for
the traditional rituals of his youth, even the religious ones. Lilly could not
understand, and when he wanted to take Rafaela to church, she was
stunned-and the arguments began. Eventually, when Rafaela was eleven
years old, they agreed to divorce and to share physical custody of Rafaela,
which the court approved. About six months after the divorce, Lilly began
seeing a new boyfriend. He was from a similar "open-minded" background
to Lilly's, and they agreed they never wanted to get married or be "stuck" in
8A single hypothetical case is used here as the basis for the analysis of the different
answers given by different ethics codes to the questions raised by the case. This aim is
different than that taken in other writing on mediation ethics, where a variety of cases are
used to exemplify different dilemmas. See, e.g., WALDMAN, supra note 2. The focus on a
single case here corresponds to the aim of the Article-to analyze how a number of
different codes would treat the same dilemma. The case is intended to be representative
of a particular kind of situation involving a particular kind of dilemma that is central to
the mediator's job. See infra notes 9-10, 15-18 and accompanying text.
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mindless traditions. After a few months, she invited him to move into her
one-room studio apartment, in which she and Rafaela lived. When Jose
found out that eleven-year-old Rafaela was living and sleeping in the same
one-room living space with Lilly and her unmarried lover, he was outraged
and went to court to demand full custody of Rafaela. The case was referred
to mediation.

B. The Mediation
In the mediation, all the above was discussed. Then, Jose and Lilly
discussed and considered several alternative living arrangements for Rafaela,
but none of them were acceptable to both: Lilly said that Jose's full custody
would be impractical, given his work schedule, and it would ignore Lilly's
and Rafaela's needs to be together. Jose said Lilly should get a larger
apartment with a separate bedroom for Rafaela, as the child had in his
apartment; but Lilly could not afford it and Jose could not afford to pay for it
himself. Jose said Lilly's boyfriend should just sleep elsewhere, but Lilly
said he was not moving out, because he was more than a boyfriend, he was
her new partner, married or not. It was clear from their statements that
behind these positions were Jose and Lilly's different values: From his
regained traditional values, Jose saw the unmarried boyfriend's presence in
Lilly's home as immoral and a bad influence on Rafaela. From her "open"
values, Lilly saw Jose's objections as narrow-minded and foolish-this was
the way she herself had grown up, after all, and was life-affirming!
After much discussion, Jose and Lilly moved towards an agreement
on a simple option: The boyfriend can stay in the one-room studio apartment
when Rafaela is in Lilly's home, as long as Lilly puts up a moveable wooden
screen in front of the corner where Rafaela sleeps when the child goes to bed.
Both Jose and Lilly are beginning to agree that the moveable screen would
be an affordable way to give Rafaela the privacy she needs as an elevenyear-old girl in the same studio apartment as a man, whether that man is her
father or someone else.

C. The Dilemma
As the agreement about the screen has begun to emerge, the
mediator has become very concerned. With knowledge and training in
matters of family mental and physical health, s/he is convinced that an
arrangement in which an eleven-year-old girl sleeps in the same room with
her mother's adult boyfriend (not her father) is inappropriate
psychologically, as well as physically risky. In effect, the mediator agrees
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with Jose's original objections, though for quite different reasons. However,
since the parties are agreeing on this arrangement, the mediator is unsure
about what the right thing is for him/her to do, with regard to the emerging
agreement about the screen.
Assuming his/her assessment of the risks to the child is correct
(according to experts in her field), should s/he state his/her views of those
risks explicitly to the parties? Should s/he question them about what risks
might be entailed without stating his/her views? Should s/he suggest or
demand that they get expert advice about their idea before adopting it? If
they are not interested in seeking expert advice, or reject the mediator's
advice, should s/he allow them to proceed with their idea; or should s/he
"veto" their proposed agreement and terminate the mediation?
Before exploring the answers to these questions, according to two
major ethics codes, a broader question: Why do any of these questions signal
an ethical dilemma, calling for ethical guidance from some sort of code of
ethics?

D. The Nature ofan EthicalDilemma
In general form, a dilemma is a situation where a choice is presented
between two important values, both of which cannot be supported at once.
That is, no matter what specific step is taken, one of the two values will
suffer. If there is a way to support both, then the dilemma vanishes.
However, there is often no way to do so; rather, no step is possible that
supports one value without damaging the other, and in that case there is a
true dilemma.9 The dilemma presented in the case here can be described as
the choice between respecting party self-determination, on the one hand, and
protecting (or avoiding risk to) a vulnerable party on the other. In a wellknown study, this type of dilemma was reported as one of the most common
and difficult that was faced by practicing mediators.' 0 This dilemma is faced
9

See Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas ofMediation Practice:A Study of
EthicalDilemmas andPolicy Implications, 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6-7; see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethicsfor a New Practice, 70
TENN. L. REv. 63, n.230 (2002).
10 Bush, supra note 9, at 22. That study identified the major types of ethical
dilemmas faced by mediators. See id, at 9-10. Commentators on mediation ethics since
then have discussed the range of ethical dilemmas that codes should address, and most of
those dilemmas were identified in the Bush study. However, while ethics codes do
address many of these other dilemmas, those dilemmas do not implicate the very core of
the mediator's role, as does the one presented by the Jose/Lilly case. See Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition? The
Mediator'sRole and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 U. FLA. L. REv. 253 (1989). See
also infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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in some version not only by family mediators but by mediators in almost any
case in which a "vulnerable party" (whether or not one of the parties actually
present in the session) is put at risk by a choice the parties are making to
agree on a solution to their problem-and in many other situations.
However, why is this an ethical dilemma for mediators? How does it
implicate mediator ethics? This article argues that not only is this an ethical
dilemma, it is a core ethical dilemma that goes to the very heart of mediation
practice, in both of the primary approaches to mediation followed today. This
assertion rests on the conception of professional ethics as a form of "rolemorality." Many dilemmas presenting options of right and wrong, in
everyday human interaction, are rooted in general conceptions of moral
obligation. However, where one has undertaken an obligation to act in a
certain role for the benefit of another-as is typical in professional practice
of all kinds-then ethical obligations to the client flow from that role itself."
This is not an unusual view; on the contrary, it characterizes the views of
professional ethics in many fields. Attorneys take on the role of "champion"
of the client's interests, and ethical obligations flow from that role, such as
the prohibition against "dual representation"-since it is impossible to
champion two adversaries simultaneously. Doctors take on the role of healer,
and the ethical obligation to "do no harm" flows from that role, including the
prohibition of administering treatments desired or even demanded by the
patient that would actually harm him/her. Judges take on the role of "voice of
the law," and the ethical obligation to set aside any personal views and
decide only according to the applicable legal rule, flows from that role.
Arbitrators take on the role of "wise, experienced expert," and the central
ethical obligation that follows is to make a clear decision and not promote a
compromise. In the case of each professional, the role s/he accepts defines
the primary ethical obligation s/he owes to the client(s). And it defines which
path to choose when a dilemma arises, because the role itself requires placing
priority on one value over others that might compete.
In keeping with the concept of professional "role ethics," it follows
that the same concept applies to mediators. However, with mediation the
issue is more complex, precisely because of the fact that two models of
mediation are being practiced, each of which holds a different conception of
the mediator's role. This author argued long ago that mediators were
enacting at least two different role conceptions: one viewing the mediator as
facilitator offair agreements-and thus as protector from unfairness-and
I See OMER

SHAPIRA, MEDIATION ETHICS 3-8 (1st ed. 2016) (discussing the theory

of role ethics).
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the other viewing the mediator as supporter of party choice and
communication regardless of the fairness of an agreement reached, or indeed
whether any is reached at all. 12 Both role conceptions, it was argued, imply
ethical duties owed by the mediator to the clients. In many respects the
ethical duties are the same under both. For example, obligations of
impartiality, confidentiality, and competency are common no matter which
role conception is followed. 13 However, in one critical respect, the two role
conceptions point mediators in very different directions. The protective
conception implies an obligation to monitor and control against unfair
outcomes even if it means limiting party choice; while the supportive
conception implies an obligation to privilege party decisionmaking
regardless of outcome fairness. Of course, some cases pose no conflict
between ensuring fairness and supporting party self-determination. But
where ensuring outcome fairness and supporting self-determination cannot
both practically be achieved, mediators face a choice-and the choice they
make will depend on what role conception they hold. In terms of this article,
it will depend on whether they follow the facilitative or transformative model
in their practice.14
It is worth noting that this tension between two views of the
mediator's role is deep and longstanding in the literature of the field. Nearly
four decades ago, the debate between Professors Susskind and Stulberg over
the mediator's "accountability" for the fairness of agreements rested on this
difference in conception of the mediator's role-Susskind arguing for
protection and Stulberg arguing for supporting self-determination as the
higher duty. 15 That debate has continued in force until the present day, and
still animates discussion in the field.1 6 This lasting controversy reinforces the
assertion that the dilemma of whether to protect against unfairness, or
support party self-determination, is central to mediation ethics. And it is a
dilemma that, unlike others, cannot be resolved by a single governing code
applied to all mediators. That is why the Jose/Lilly case is used as the

12

See Bush, supranote 10.

13 SHAPIRA,
14
1

supranote 11, at 88-105.

See infra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence Susskind, EnvironmentalMediation and the Accountability

Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981); Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practiceof
Mediation: A Reply to ProfessorSusskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).
6 See Bernie Mayer, What We Talk About When We Talk About Neutrality: A
Commentary on the Susskind-Stulberg Debate, 2011 Edition, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 859
(2011-2012).
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17
example for the analysis of this Article. The protection versus selfdetermination dilemma, as reflected in the Jose/Lilly case and many others,
is the defining ethical challenge of mediators. That is, it defines and is
defined by the role conception on which a mediator's practice is founded.
And ethical standards that ignore the foundational difference in role
conceptions will inevitably fail to guide all mediators fairly and effectively.

8

MEDIATION MODELS AND MEDIATION CODES

III.

The mediation field is not short on ethical codes. On the contrary,
codes or standards of conduct have been promulgated for many years by
different agencies, including state court systems, professional associations,
19
and even private mediation providers. These codes purport to offer
guidance to mediators in situations just like the one faced in the case of Jose
and Lilly. At the same time, they can be seen as regulating the behavior of
mediators, so that clients like Jose and Lilly receive appropriate professional
Other cases also involve risks to vulnerable parties-whether third parties as here
or parties to the mediation itself, and whether in the family conflict context or in others.
But this scenario presents a strong version of this dilemma, where the pulls toward each
value, and thus the tension between them, is particularly sharp. Note also that this Article
focuses on one illustrative case, rather than offering multiple case examples, because the
aim is to provide a focus for analyzing the way different ethics standards deal with this
particular dilemma, rather than raising multiple ethics questions. See also supra note 8.
It should also be noted that the mediator's role conception and ethical
obligations-and those of other professionals, as mentioned above-can be seen as
having two sources. One is the implied (or explicit) promise made by the professional to
clients regarding what will be done for them. Where this is not wholly explicit, it can be
implied from the usual expectation held by the client regarding the professional's role
and the actions they will take. In the case of mediation, this is somewhat problematic,
since in the presence of different models it is not clear what a particular client expects
from a particular mediator unless an initial meeting spells that out-a useful practice, as
discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 212-14. Another source for role
conception, more general in nature, is the natural comparison between the "products" of
different professionals. Regarding mediation, the question is what mediators can do for
parties in conflict that is unique and different from what other "third party" interveners
such as judges and arbitrators can do. As this author discussed ina previous article,
arbitrators provide quick, expert resolutions, and judges provide resolutions that protect
rights and ensure justice/fairness. Only mediators offer parties the opportunity for selfdetermination and direct communication. See Bush, supra note 10.
19
See Susan Nauss Exon, How Can a MediatorBe Both Impartialand
Fair?: Why Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators,
2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 388 (2006) (providing a comprehensive review of
different mediation ethics codes).
17
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20

services. Whether regarded as guidance for mediators or consumer quality
control for clients, ethical codes are an important presence in the field.
However, these well-intentioned policy statements often create-rather than
resolve-dilemmas for the mediators they are intended to guide and regulate.
The reason for this is simple: the codes are drafted without recognition of the
pluralistic character of mediation practice today. They effectively cast all
mediators in a single mold, whereas in practice the mediators being
addressed are not practicing a single monolithic process called mediation.21
They are practicing two significantly different processes called facilitative
mediation and transformative mediation. At this point, a short summary of
these two models is needed to establish that they are indeed different and
distinct in both aim and in method.

A. The Facilitative(Protective/Directive)Approach
In the facilitative approach, mediation is seen as a process aimed at
reaching fair and creative resolutions of specific problems faced by parties in
conflict. To achieve that goal, the mediator leads the parties through a
sequence of stages: opening the session, setting ground rules, gathering
information, defining issues, exploring options, generating movement by
forceful persuasion, and achieving agreement.22 While the description of
stages in the literature differs from text to text, the commonalities are very
clear. What is also clear is the principle that the mediator controls and directs
the process at every stage and that effective mediation requires the exercise
of such mediator control to keep the process moving toward agreement and
to protect against unfairness. 23 From this fundamental principle of mediator
20

See SHAPIRA, supra note 11, at ch. 2.

21 See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A

Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997); see infra text
accompanying notes 187-90.
22 This approach is known as "facilitative mediation." On the view of problemsolving as the goal of facilitative mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many
Ways of Mediation: The Transformationof Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms,and
Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217, 225-27 (1995); LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 180-86 (2005). On the view that the process involves a series
of stages, see ALFINI ET AL., supranote 1, at 107-40 (2006); Bush, supra note 2, at 96971 (both offering a good summary of the stages followed in facilitative mediation).
23 See Bush, supra note 2, at 969-71; Stulberg, supra note 15 (presenting a good
description of the classical view of how the mediator controls the process); see also
Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities ofMaking Talk Work, in WHEN
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 459,470-74 (D.M. Kolb & Associates, eds.,
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control of the process, specific mediator practices follow, many of which
involve limiting or overruling party self-determination in order to ensure a
fair or just outcome.
Some of the practices recommended and documented in mediation
literature include encouraging or steering the parties, especially through
probing and pointed questions, to consider the fairness/justice dimensions of
24

issues being discussed or solutions being proposed; advising parties who
lack relevant information, regarding legal rights or otherwise, to obtain that
information before reaching any agreement (and even providing them with
25
information within the mediator's knowledge); openly discussing the
importance of (and asking parties to commit to) achieving just outcomes, in
26

mediators' opening statements on the aims of the process; and directly
suggesting or supporting specific proposals aimed at creating a fair
27
outcome. In general, it is a common view that "[w]hen disparities in power
or knowledge disable a weaker party from effective bargaining the mediator
28

must intervene to avoid a patently unfair agreement... ." To do so, many
recognized mediation experts recommend that the mediator affirmatively

1994) (summarizing what they call the "settlement-oriented" mediator's strategies for
controlling the process, based on their close qualitative study of several mediators at
work). This practice of mediator process control, despite the importance placed on party
self-determination in mediation theory, is often explained with the conventional wisdom
that "the parties control the outcome, but the mediator controls the process." Id.
24

See, e.g., James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination
on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination andNeutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 65, 84-85 (2004); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, IfPortia Were a
Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 180-82 (2002).
25

See, e.g., Hyman & Love, supra note 24, at 85-86; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,
Court Mediation and the Searchfor Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 47, 92-96
(1996); Waldman, supra note 21, at 732-42 (1997).
26
See, e.g., Isabelle R. Gunning, Know Justice, Know Peace: FurtherReflections on
Justice, Equality and Impartialityin Settlement Oriented and Transformative Mediations,
5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT REsOL. 87, 91-91 (2004).
27

See, e.g., Waldman, supranote 21, at 742-56; Kolb & Kressel, supra note 23, at
471-74.
28
Judith L. Maute, Public Values and PrivateJustice: A Casefor Mediator
Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 521 (1991); see also Nolan-Haley, supra
note 25; Coben, supra note 24, at 83-87.
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engage in "power-balancing"-a practice directly aimed at "minimizing the
negative effects of unequal power." 2 9
While there are many other practices used by facilitative mediators
aimed at moving the parties toward agreement on the issues that separate
them,30 the methods mentioned here illustrate the primacy placed on the
29 The facilitative mediator's job of power-balancing is recognized as
a key part of
his or her work by many authoritative sources. For example, Christopher Moore, author
of one of the basic and widely used texts on mediation practice, includes the following
advice regarding power-balancing: "Mediators can work with both weaker and stronger
parties to minimize the negative effects of unequal power... ." CHRISTOPHER W.

MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT

391-93 (3d ed. 2003) (quoting in part James A. Wall Jr., Mediation: An Analysis Review
andProposedResearch, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 157, 164 (1981)). Moore believes that
the mediator has substantial tools at his or her disposal that can effectively protect
weaker parties from the effects of unequal power in the mediation, and thus prevent
unjust outcomes. According to Moore and others, the mediator is expected to use these
tools to do just that. John Haynes, another widely recognized authority and one of the
founders of divorce mediation, goes even further in his endorsement of power-balancing
and his claim that it is effective in preventing unjust outcomes: "Power balancing is
important because .. . differential power or resources is likely to result in an unequal
distribution .... When the power balance interferes with the couple's ability to negotiate
a fair agreement, I believe the mediator has a responsibility to correct that imbalance."
John Haynes, Power Balancing,in DIVORCE MEDIATION 277, 280-81 (J. Folberg & Ann
Milne eds., 1988) (quoting in part JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 79 (1975)). Haynes goes on to explain
that there are multiple strategies by which the mediator can "correct" the power
imbalance, including "controlling the communication" between the parties.... [T]he

mediator intervenes to take charge of the way the couple communicate and reorganizes it
to disempower the overly powerful spouse and empower the powerless spouse." Id at
289-90. It is very clear that these well-respected mediation experts regard powerbalancing as a key responsibility of the facilitative mediator, that they identify practical
strategies to discharge this responsibility, and that they believe that the mediator's powerbalancing can effectively protect weaker parties from stronger ones who could otherwise
take advantage of their power to gain unjust and unfair agreements.
30 These practices include both managingthe parties'communication
and problemsolving. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, MediationSkills and Client-CenteredLawyering: A
New View of the Partnership,19 CLINICAL L. REv. 429, 436-39 (20122013) (summarizing the practices described below in this footnote and citing sources
documenting them). Both involve measures that intrude on party self-determination.
Managingcommunication goes on throughout a session, to avoid the disorganized and
unproductive exchange the parties are likely to have if communication is not structured
and controlled. Key practices include: structuringthe session (the mediator organizes and
structures the entire session, including when to move from one stage to the next);
controlling the flow of information (mediators firmly control the flow of informationthey direct turn-taking, prevent party interruptions, and ask "probing questions" to elicit

472

A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO MEDIATION ETHICS

mediator's role in protecting against unfairness in the process or outcome.
All these practices stem from the view that the facilitative mediator is
expected to monitor for and ensure that mediated agreements meet standards
of substantive fairness, even if this involves overriding or limiting party selfdetermination.31

B. The Transformative (Supportive/Nondirective)Approach
By contrast, the most fundamental principle of the transformative
approach is that the mediator's job is "to support and never supplant party
deliberation and decision-making," on every matter whether regarding
process or outcome.32 Thus, mediators following this approach do not control
or direct the process, do not use interventions that intentionally steer the
more information); and controlling andfiltering negative expression (mediators filter the
subjects discussed and modes of expression used and control parties when they get
emotional or hostile; they "reframe" party statements into non-antagonistic language; and
they limit discussions of the past to keep parties "focused on the future"). The practices
of problem solving are also central to the mediator's work, with the mediator serving, in
effect, as the lead problem solver. Several practices are central: identifying underlying
"needs and interests" (mediators translate parties' demands into "needs and interests,"
probing for the interest that underlies a demand, and leading the parties into an
integrative or interest-based bargaining process); devising creative solutions that meet all
sides' needs (mediators act, themselves, as skilled integrative bargainers and identify
solutions that will "solve the problem" faced by the parties); and persuadingthe parties
to accept the solution and reach agreement (mediators use a variety of techniques for
"closing the deal," using persuasion on one or both parties, including "devil's advocacy"
and "reality testing").
3 According to some knowledgeable observers, a minority of facilitative mediators
is gradually moving away from directive practices that prioritize substantive fairness over
party self-determination. See Email from Peter Miller to author (Aug. 26, 2018) (on file
with author). Miller, who is very active in the practitioner community in New York,
reports examples of this move by both mediators and mediation trainers with whom he
personally works. He also notes, which is certainly true, that Professor Joseph Stulberg,
one of the foremost authorities on facilitative mediation, has long supported the primacy
of party self-determination. Indeed, Stulberg's work was one of the main sources for this
author's account of self-determination as the guiding value of mediation. See Bush, supra
note 10; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the majority of
commentary and research on facilitative mediation supports the account of the text that
this approach places highest priority on achieving agreements that are substantively fair.
Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Transformative Mediation:
TheoreticalFoundations,in TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION: A SOURCEBOOKRESOURCES FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION PRACTITIONERS AND PROGRAMS [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK] 15, 25 (Joseph P. Folger et al., eds., 2010).
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discussion, and do not substitute their judgment for the parties' on any matter
of process, substance, or communication. In short, the process is not
mediator-driven, but party-driven. What mediators do, instead of directing
the process themselves, is to support the parties'own process of presenting

their views, thinking about what is being said, and making their own
decisions on how to understand the situation, their options, and each otherand ultimately on what, if anything, they want to do about all of these things.
Thus the essential work of the transformative mediator is to support
the parties'choices, rather than to direct them in any way, and to do so
without judging the fairness or justice of the process or outcome the parties
choose. 3 This means becoming a participant in, but not the controller of, the
conversation. The mediator's role is supportive but non-directive
participation. The mediator's job is to support party decisionmaking but
never supplant it, whether to ensure fairness or for any other reason. Specific
practices flow from these principles, which respect and facilitate party selfdetermination even if doing so may allow risks of unfairness in the process
or outcome.
First of all, mediators in this model let go of control of the session
and its outcome, rather than holding onto it firmly. From the very opening of
the session, parties can interrupt each other (and the mediator), change
topics, return to subjects discussed earlier, and so forth. The mediator
supports this freedom of choice, and refrains from "organizing" the
discussion and thereby exercising influence over the process or outcome.34
3 See Robert A. Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Transformative Mediation: Core
Practices,in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 32, at 31, 31-50 (discussing specific practices that

support party deliberation and decisionmaking without controlling it); see also Bush,
supra note 30, at 439-45 and accompanying notes (providing an expanded account of the
practices summarized in the text here). The reason for employing supportive rather than
directive practices is that the aim of the process is party empowerment and interparty
recognition-andthus positive interactional change-rather than resolution or even a just
resolution; and interactional change is most likely achieved through mediator support
rather than mediator direction. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbitor Breaking
Free: The Relationship ofMediation to the Courts over Four Decades, 84 N.D.L. REV.
705, 747-48 (2008). Although, even considering justice as a goal, it has been
persuasively argued that steady support for party choice is itself the best guarantee of
justice and fairness. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards
Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213 (2005).
34 The skill of letting go of process control involves many different specifics;
one
specific aspect of the skill is to avoid "we" talk by the mediator, which implies the
mediator holds the same status as the parties in making choices. Instead, mediators learn
to use the "you" form of address to convey respect for the parties' authority over the
conversation. See Della Noce et al., Signposts and Crossroads:A Modelfor Live Action
Mediator Assessment, 23 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 197, 212 -15 (2008)
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Meanwhile, the mediator listens attentively but "without an agenda"-i.e.,
without thinking about how to "use" what is being said, for example, to plan
toward a solution or to "balance power."35
At the same time, the mediator uses a variety of methods to
"amplify" the parties' exchange. Such "amplification" places parties in
control of their own discourse, rather than controlling it in any way. For
example, mediators "reflect" party's narrative comments without changing or
filtering their content or tone. Building on the attentive listening s/he did, the
mediator "mirrors" each party comment back, staying close to the party's
36
actual language and being careful not to filter or soften what is said. This
kind of response allows the speaking party to hear and consider her own
thoughts, and thus to define more deliberately for herselfwhat she wants to
say. Mediators also offer verbal "outlines" of segments of the conversation,
listing but not editing or shaping the topics the parties have mentioned and

35

In one training manual, the skill is explained by an analogy to "listening like a

cow":
Pay attention ... Just be there. Don't be
thinking about a solution, or how you should fix it.
Just listen hard and try to be present. It's very bad
business to invite heartfelt speech and then not
listen .... [This] is a theory of attention that
depends little on therapeutic skills and formal
training: listening like a cow. Those of you who
grew up in the country know that cows are good
listeners . . .. This is a great antidote to the critical
listening that goes on . . . where we listen for the
mistake, the flaw in the argument. Cows, by
contrast, manage at least the appearance of deep,
openhearted attention.
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION, TRANSFORMATIVE

MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2010) (citing MARY ROSE O'REILLY, RADICAL
PRESENCE 27-29 (1998)).

&

For concrete examples of the use of reflection and summary in mediations, see
Bush & Folger, supra note 33, at 39-44 and see generally Robert A. Baruch Bush
Sally G. Pope, Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principlesand Practice
of Transformative Mediation, 3 PEPPERDINE DisP. RES. L.J.67 (2002). For an extended
case study illustrating all of the skills discussed here in the text, see BUSH & FOLGER,
supra note 1, at 131-270. Note the contrast between the practice of reflection as
described here, and the practice of "reframing" as used in facilitative mediation, where
filtering and softening party language is a central skill. See supra note 30.
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the differences they expressed on each topic, again in whatever terms the
parties choose to use. Moreover, in both reflecting and summarizing,
mediators embrace rather than suppress the "hot" parts of the conversation.
Rather than limiting or reframing negative and emotional expression,
mediators allow it and then include the negative and the emotional in their
reflections and summaries. All these practices allow and help parties to
become more effective advocatesfor themselves, expressing their views to
each other clearly and forcefully, without the mediator controlling or
"power-balancing" their exchange.
Finally, when parties make choices-about what to say, or when and
how to say it, or what options to consider or reject-the mediator does not
question them in order to influence what is and is not chosen. In fact, the
transformative approach largely avoids questioning parties at all (e.g., to
probe or influence), instead using questions only to "check-in" when parties
show signs of hesitation or uncertainty about some aspect of the discussion.
The aim of such questions is, as with the other methods mentioned here, to
increase the parties' opportunity for self-determination and choice-but not
to monitor or shape the choices being made, even in order to prevent what
might be seen as injustice.

C. Different Models, Different Aims, Different SkillsDifferent Ethics?
It should be clear from the above comparison of methods that the
practices of facilitative and transformative mediation are very different. The
difference is understandable, considering the very different conceptions the
two models hold of the aim of mediation and the role of the mediator in the
process. In relation to ethical codes, the last point is the crucial one. As

3 See Bush & Folger, supra note 33, at 41-44 (describing and illustrating the
practice of summary). In courses on transformative mediation, law students and lawyers
usually find summary a more familiar skill, since it involves more of the kind of "issuespotting" that they are trained and accustomed to do by their legal training.
See Della Noce et al., supra note 34, at 213-14 (discussing this practice and the
rationale for it). Once again, this skill contrasts sharply with the skills taught and
practiced in facilitative mediation, as discussed above. Indeed, it has been argued that the
implicit "rules" of facilitative mediation-rules that are "applied" by the mediator in
controlling the process-require the suppression of expressions of blame as well as
negative emotions generally. See Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1555-75 (1991) (describing the use of rules of
rationality, prospectivity, and compromise in ways that disadvantage women and
minorities).

476

A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO MEDIATION ETHICS

discussed above, professional ethics codes begin from the conception of the
professional's role in relation to the client(s).
In mediation, the mediator's role is ... . This sentence cannot be
completed easily because in mediation, given the pluralistic nature of
practice as described above, the description of the mediator's role is not
singular. Rather, the mediator's role can be defined in one or the other of two
different ways: In the facilitative model, the mediator's role is "problemsolver" and guarantor of fairness, guiding the parties to a resolution that
meets the needs and interests of both/all parties and avoids injustice to
anyone.4 0 In the transformative model the mediator's role is "conversation
supporter," supporter of the parties' communication and decisionmaking, as
they explore issues and options for resolution whose justice they alone judge
and define. 4 1 These two roles point down two different paths, as the above
discussion of the key practices of each model illustrates: The facilitative role
points and leads the mediator into managing communication, solving
problems and guarding against unfairness, all of which include many highly
directive practices. The transformative role points and leads the mediator into
following and amplifying the parties' conversation, using non-directive but
supportive practices that enhance but never supplant the parties' own
choices, even if those choices lead to what might seem to others like unjust
outcomes.
Does this difference in role conception and practices have
ramifications for the adoption of codes of ethics to guide and regulate the
conduct of mediators? Indeed it does, and the foundational differences
should be and are reflected in such codes. If so, then the codes that reflect
these differences will offer very different guidance to mediators in cases like
that of Jose and Lilly. The following Part of the Article demonstrates that
difference and highlights the difficulty this poses for practicing mediators
who may be subject to codes that reflect different views of the mediator's
role and point in different directions on questions of ethical practice.
MEDIATION CODES AND MEDIATOR CHOICES

IV.

The best way to illustrate the way in which ethics codes point
mediators in different directions is to return to the case of Jose and Lilly, and
Rafaela, and examine how two different codes of ethics would answer
differently the questions facing the mediator in that case. In this examination,
3
40
41

See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
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the significance of the different answers given can best be appreciated if the
assumption is made that the mediator of the case is subject to both of these
codes, a very real possibility.
Imagine that the Jose/Lilly case is mediated in one of the many
community mediation centers overseen by the New York State Court
System's Office of ADR Programs (OADR), by a lawyer who is a member
of the American Bar Association's Family Law Section (ABA). Each of
these entities has promulgated an ethics code, or "standards of conduct," to
guide the conduct of mediators working under its aegis.42 If so, a volunteer
community mediator who is also a family lawyer-not an unusual
situation-is subject to the regulation/guidance of both of these codes. The
following sections examine the portions of each code that would govern the
situation presented in the Jose/Lilly case and direct the mediator how to
answer his/her questions. First, however, it is instructive to see how each of
these codes defines the role of the mediator, the core element in constructing
ethical standards-and how different the definition is in each code.

A. The Role of the Mediator
According to the ABA Standards for Family and Divorce Mediation
("Family Code"), "The primary role of a family mediator is to assist the
participants to gain a better understanding of their own needs and interests
and the needs and interests of others and to facilitate agreement among the
participants."43 Clearly, the Family Code defines the role of the mediator in a
manner consistent with the facilitative model of mediation-to help the
parties reach agreements that solve their problems by meeting the needs and
interests of all parties and avoiding unfairness. By contrast, the OADR
Standards for Community Mediation Centers ("Community Code") states
42

See STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR NEW YORK STATE COMMUNITY DISPUTE

RESOLUTION CENTER MEDIATORS (N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAM 2009), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-

07/Standards of Conduct.pdf [hereinafter Community Code]; see also MODEL
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, 35 FAM. L.Q. 27

(2001), available at
https://www.afccnet.org/Portals/0/PublicDocuments/CEFCP/ModelStandardsOfPracticeF
orFamilyAndDivorceMediation.pdf [hereinafter Family Code]. The American Bar
Association adopted the Family Code in 2001, and the Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts adopted the Family Code in 2000.
43
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that, "The primary purpose [role] of a mediator is to help the parties
communicate, negotiate, and/or make decisions."44 This definition is more
consistent with the transformative model of mediation-the mediator's role
is to support parties' communication and decisionmaking per se, and neither
problem-solving nor agreement is even mentioned.
Therefore, these two codes, and the standards contained in them, rest
on very different foundational definitions of the mediator's role. From this
starting point, it seems likely that a facilitative mediator will find more useful
guidance in, and will find it easier to comply with, the Family Code; while a
transformative mediator will find more guidance, and more appropriate
regulation, in the Community Code. But if this is so, the mediator of the
Jose/Lilly case-a lawyer mediator volunteering in a community mediation
center-will likely be torn about what to do, regardless of whether s/he
follows the facilitative or transformative model, because in this case s/he is
required to adhere to two codes that point in opposite directions with regard
to those models. If the mediator is transformative, his/her practice will
almost certainly run counter to the Family Code in important respects; if s/he
is facilitative, his/her practice will almost certainly run counter to the
Community Code. How then can this mediator find answers to his/her
questions, and practice in a manner that meets his/her ethical obligations?
Before trying to answer this difficult question, it is important to
deepen the question by looking more closely at the different answers these
two codes give to the questions raised by the case of Jose, Lilly and Rafaela.
Recall those questions, as posed earlier in the Article:
1.

2.
3.
4.

4Community

Assuming the mediator's assessment is correct, regarding the
risks to the child of Jose and Lilly's agreement to have her sleep
behind a screen in the adults' room, should the mediator state
his/her views of those risks explicitly to the parties?
Should s/he question them about what risks might be entailed, to
get them to consider those risks, without stating her views?
Should s/he suggest or demand that they get expert advice about
their idea before adopting it?
If they are not interested in considering the issue or seeking
expert advice, or reject the mediator's direct advice, should s/he
allow them to proceed with their idea after all; or should s/he
"veto" their proposed agreement and terminate the mediation?

Code, supra note 42, at Standard VI cmt. 5.
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As stated earlier, the essence of the dilemma underlying these questions is
the tension between the value of self-determination and the value of
protecting the weak and vulnerable, since any answer to the 2 uestions will
likely sustain one of these values at the expense of the other.
In examining the provisions of the two codes that might address
these questions, bear in mind that ethical codes generally use three terms in
addressing mediator conduct, or "do's and don'ts"-may (not), should (not),
and shall (not). These terms are used to indicate conduct that is permissive,
advisable, and mandatory. A mediator will consider carefully which of these
terms is used in connection with a certain standard of conduct, not only to get
proper guidance, but to ensure compliance with ethical requirements.

B. Resolving the Dilemmas ofthe Jose/Lilly Case Under the
Family Code
As noted, the Family Code's view of the mediator's role seems
consistent with the facilitative model of mediation: the mediator is there to
facilitate an agreement that solves the problem in a way that meets the
parties' needs and avoids unfairness. The first suggestion of a general answer
to the questions-and the underlying tension between the self-determination
and protection values-comes in the very definition of the mediator's role
quoted above: the mediator is to help the parties "gain a better understanding
of their own needs and interests and the needs and interests of others"presumably including affected and vulnerable "third parties" not directly
involved in the session, like Rafaela in our case. 4 6 Moreover the completion
of the definitional provision, "and facilitate agreement among the
participants" suggests that this agreement should be one that takes all these
needs and interests into account and avoids unfairness.4 7
Thus, the implication from the start is that the mediator has an
obligation to ensure that the parties do not disregard the interests of affected
others, particularly vulnerable others like Rafaela. This view is entirely
consistent with the modern view of facilitative mediation, in which the
obligation to ensure fairness (between the parties and to outsiders) is
encompassed by the aim of problem solving.4 8 Problem solving involves

45 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46
47

Family Code, supra note 42, at Standard
I.B.

d

See Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and SocialJustice:
Risks and Opportunities,27 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 10-15 (2012) (discussing the
"best practices" view of facilitative mediation).
48
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reaching good quality outcomes, and unfair agreements are by definition not
good quality outcomes. This refinement of the view of the aim of facilitative
49
mediation has been widely accepted today. Therefore as noted above, the
facilitative mediator's role must be protective in some degree, because
parties themselves will not necessarily take each other's interests, or those of
third parties, into account. Who will see that they are taken into account? The
mediator will do so, as part of his/her foundational role of problem solver
searching for fair, good quality outcomes. Having noted this general
orientation of the Family Code, consider each of the mediator's questions
separately. With each question, recall that the mediator believes that the
screen solution is dangerous to Jose and Lilly's child, despite the couple's
agreement on this solution.
1.

SHOULD THE MEDIATOR STATE EXPLICITLY TO JOSE AND
LILLYHis/HER VIEW REGARDING THE RISKS TO RAFAELA
OF THE SLEEPING SCREEN ARRANGEMENT THEYARE
AGREEING To?

An answer to this question is given, or at least implied, by
considering several sections of the Family Code. First, Standard I ("shall
recognize that mediation is based on the principle of self-determination")
states that the process "relies on the ability of participants to make their own
50
voluntary and informed decisions." If the mediator believes that the
participants are about to make a decision uninformed by crucial information
about risks to their child, this might at least permit, though perhaps not
require, him/her to inform them about those risks.
Looking further in the Family Code, Standard VI ("shall structure
the process so that ... decisions [are] based on sufficient information and
knowledge") provides that "a mediator may provide the participants with
information that the mediator is qualified by training or experience to
5
provide. The mediator shall not provide therapy or legal advice." In the
case at hand, it is given that the mediator has training/experience in child
welfare. Therefore this provision would clearly permit the mediator to share
her view, as an expert in the field, that the screen arrangement, according to
the current state of experts' understanding, would pose risks to Rafaela's

49

See id.

Family Code, supra note 42, at Standard L.A (emphasis added).
" Id at Standard VI.B. (emphasis added).
50
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welfare-provided that s/he presents this view as "information" and not
"advice." 5 2 So, to address the language of the question, the mediator may tell
the participants of the experts' view on this type of situation, but the
mediator probably should not present it as his/her personalview, in order to
steer clear of the restriction on advice-giving.
While this provision allows the mediator to explicitly state the risks
to Rafaela, it does not recommend or require the mediator to do so. On the
other hand, taken together with the definitional provision discussed above,
the Family Code could be understood to recommend or require the mediator
to share this information because it will "help the participants understand ...
the needs and interests of others"-namely, Rafaela. Therefore, the Family
Code at least allows, and may even recommend or require, the mediator to
tell Jose and Lilly about the experts' view that this arrangement would be
risky to Rafaela, even though doing so would be an attempt to influence their
decision and would thus intrude on their right of self-determination.5 3
2. SHOULD THE MEDIATOR QUESTION JOSE AND LILLY
ABOUT WHAT RISKS MIGHT BE ENTAILED, TO GET THEM
TO CONSIDER THOSE RISKS, WITHOUT STA TING HER OWN
VIEW OR "EXPERT OPINION" EXPLICITLY?

This question contemplates a less directive means of getting the
mediator's concern about Rafaela's welfare into consideration by the parents.
It assumes that the mediator is not comfortable presenting the information
about risks directly, as expert information (and does not believe that doing so
is required), but she is still concerned about the danger posed to Rafaela.
Therefore, she thinks it might be appropriate at least to prompt the parties to
52 But see Bush, supra note 9, at 29-30 (reporting that many mediators find this line
difficult to define, and that, in fact, any information offered may seem "one-sided," since
it may often weigh in favor of one party's views rather than the other party's, running
afoul of the obligation to be impartial).
5 On another reading of the Family Code, this might not be disregarding the
"principle of self-determination" as set forth in Standard I, because that Standard itself
describes self-determination as "rel[ying] on the ability of the participants to make
voluntary and informed decisions" (emphasis added). The key term here is "informed,"
suggesting that where the parties lack critical information-such as the risks to Rafaela
here-their ability to make informed decisions is lacking. Therefore, supplying that
information, or otherwise bringing it to their attention by steps discussed below, actually
supports rather than detracts from their exercise of self-determination. See, e.g., Joseph
B. Stulberg, Must a MediatorBe Neutral? You'd Better Believe It!, 95 MARQUETTE
L. REV. 829, 829 (2012). However, see infra text accompanying notes 70-72 for a
different view regarding the question of "informed consent."
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consider that there may be risks involved in their proposed screen
arrangement, for example by raising questions as they discuss the proposal.
For example, she might ask, "That's an interesting idea, to use a screen, but
do you see any downside to this for Rafaela, or would it be fine for her?"
Facilitating a discussion of this question could focus the parents' attention on
Rafaela's welfare and lead them to reconsider the desirability of this
arrangement.
The Family Code's provisions suggest that taking this step would be
ethically permissible, and even desirable. Thus, Standard VIII ("shall ...
assist participants in determining how to promote the best interests of
children") provides that "The mediator should encouragethe participants to
explore the range of options available for separation or post divorce
54
parenting arrangements and their respective costs and benefits." The
"should" language of the Standard indicates that this kind of mediator
encouragement is recommended, not just permissible, and possible risks to
Rafaela from the screen arrangement certainly qualify as "costs" of a
parenting arrangement. Furthermore, under that Standard, the Family Code
further suggests that this exploration may include topics such as "information
... that can help the participants and their children cope with the
consequences of family reorganization," "development of a parenting plan
that covers the children's physical residence with appropriate levels of
5
detail," and "the developmental needs of the children." Clearly, the
question of the screen arrangement for Rafaela clearly relates to all of these
topics, and is therefore well within the scope of the Family Code's
recommendation that the mediator encourage exploration of this question
with Jose and Lilly, even though doing so intrudes on party selfdetermination.

3. SHOULD THE MEDIATOR SUGGEST OR DEMAND THATJOSE
AND LILLY GET EXPERTADVICE ABOUT THEIR SCREEN
IDEA BEFOREADOPTING IT?
This next question assumes that, in whatever discussion the mediator
encourages regarding the screen proposal, Jose and Lilly still see no
significant downside for Rafaela. Since the mediator him/herself is not
permitted (under Standard VI) 5 6 to give therapeutic or legal advice but
remains concerned about the risks to Rafaela, s/he is contemplating the step
54

5

Family Code, supra note 42, at Standard VIII.A (emphasis added).
Id.
56I.at Standard V1.13.
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of recommending that the parents get advice from a child/family counselor
who is an expert-thinking that this counselor will likely advise against the
arrangement. Of the questions asked thus far, the answer to this is the
clearest. According to Standard VI ("decisions based on sufficient
information"), "acquisition and development of information during
mediation, so that the participants can make informed decisions . . . may be
accomplished by encouraging participants to consult appropriate experts."5
In addition, Standard VIII ("promote the best interests of children")
provides that in discussing the "costs and benefits" of parenting
arrangements, "Referral to a specialist in child development may be
appropriate for these purposes."ss The language of the Family Code is
permissive here-using the term "may" rather than "should" or "shall."
Thus, the Family Code stops well short of requiring or even recommending
such referrals. However, the Family Code's permissive language indicates
that, in taking the step of referring-and encouraging-the parties to consult
outside experts in child welfare, the mediator would be on solid ethical
ground.

4.

ULTIMATELY, IF LILLYAND JOSE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN
SEEKING EXPERTAD VICE, AND THEY DECIDE TO IGNORE
THE EXPERT INFORMATION THE MEDIA TOR GIVES THEM
ABOUT CHILD WELFARE, SHOULD S/HE ALLOW THEM TO
PROCEED WITH THEIR AGREEMENT ON THE SCREEN,- OR
SHOULD S/IHE " VETO " THEIR PROPOSEDAGREEMENT
AND TERMINATE THE MEDIATION?

Mediation students or trainees often assume that, once it is
concluded that the mediator can give the parties "child welfare" information
directly, or at least refer them to an expert who will advise them about risks
to Rafaela, the dilemma is resolved. But this ignores the very real possibility
that the parents will dismiss the mediator's "expert" information and reject
the idea of seeking outside advice. Parents-and other parties to mediationare often leery of experts, as well as unwilling to bear additional costs.
Addressing the dilemma must include the final question of what, if anything,
to do if Jose and Lilly reject all the mediator's efforts to highlight the risk of
the screen proposal to Rafaela through the steps discussed previously. This
is, in a sense, the toughest question involved in this situation, and mediators
often give it short shrift by assuming that the steps discussed previously will
"work" to change the parents' mind. In fact, it is in addressing the toughest
57 Id at Standard VI.A (emphasis added).
' Id at Standard.VIII.A. (emphasis added).
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.

questions that an ethical code reveals its underlying orientation. And it is
here that the Family Code gives its strongest direction, and the clearest
indication of what side of the value choice-protection or party selfdetermination-it ultimately weighs more heavily.
In Standard XI ("shall suspend or terminate the mediation process .
for compelling reason"), the Family Code states that "a mediator should
consider suspending or terminating the mediation if .. . [the] well-being of a
child is threatened [or] the participants are about to enter into an agreement
59
that the mediator reasonably believes to be unconscionable." Given the
mediator's view of the risks to Rafaela posed here, and the insistence on the
parents on going forward despite hearing of those risks through one of the
steps discussed earlier, it would be reasonable indeed for the mediator to
conclude that Rafaela's well-being is being threatened and that the
agreement about to be made is unconscionable in light of that threat. And in
that case, the Family Code states, the mediator is requiredto step in and
"pull the plug" on the process ("shall suspend or terminate"), despite the
parents' desire to go ahead. Of course, as often suggested when this
requirement to terminate is mentioned, the parents can certainly go ahead
without the mediator, since they've basically achieved an agreement-so
60
what is the point of the mediator's "vetoing" the agreement at this point?
The answer is that the mediator's "veto" may still stop them, or give them
pause, and at any rate it avoids the mediator's endorsement of a bad solution.
In effect, this standard is a clear statement from the Family Code
that, in terms of ethical obligations, the mediator's accountability for the
agreement's fairness and quality "trumps" the mediator's duty to support
party self-determination. The Family Code resolves the difficult choice
between the values of fairness and self-determination in favor of the outcome
fairness/quality value.

5. SUMMARY
Thus, in analyzing the Family Code to find answers to the specific
questions that arise for the mediator in this case, it is clear that the Family
Code permits, recommends, and ultimately requires the mediator to take
steps that privilege protecting Rafaela, as a vulnerable person, over
supporting the exercise of self-determination by Jose and Lilly, the actual
" Id at Standard X.A.1, A.4.
60 Joseph P. Folger & Sidney Bernard, Divorce Mediation: When Mediators
Challenge the Divorcing Parties, 10 MEDIATION Q. 5 (1985) (reporting on a survey
showing that mediators often "veto" an agreement they believe is unfair or unwise).
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parties in the session. The guidance is clear and consistent, giving the
mediator a well-defined direction to take in addressing the dilemma
presented. It is also clear that this guidance is much more consistent with the
facilitative approach to mediation than with the transformative approach.
From beginning (Standard I) to end (Standard XI), the Family Code endorses
the goal and strategies of a well-trained facilitative mediator-to seek to
achieve an agreement that meets the needs of all affected parties and avoids
unfairness, by directing and shaping the discussion of the issues toward that
end and steering the parties away from unfair outcomes, even at the expense
of party self-determination.

C. Resolving the Dilemmas ofthe Jose/Lilly Case Under the
Community Code
As noted earlier, the Community Code's view of the mediator's role
seems consistent with the transformative model of mediation, in which the
mediator's job is to support the parties' communication and decisionmaking,
without pressing for an agreement on those issues, or for any other particular
outcome, and without judging the fairness of any agreement the parties
decide to make. Seemingly reflecting this view, the first suggestion of a
general answer to the questions about what to do in the Jose/Lilly case-and
the implicit tension between the self-determination and protection valuescomes in the Community Code's definition of the mediator's role quoted
earlier: "The primary purpose [and role] of a mediator is to help the parties
communicate, negotiate, and/or make decisions."6 1
The Code's statement is clear: the mediator's fundamental obligation
is to support the parties' conversation but without influencing or pressuring
them in any specific direction. In fact, the goal of agreement is not even
mentioned in this definition nor is the concept of party needs and interests,
whether those of the primary parties or those of affected and possibly
vulnerable others like Rafaela. Rather, the terms used focus on
"communication" and "decisionmaking." This definition of the mediator's
role is entirely consistent with the approach of transformative mediation, in
which the mediator's primary task is defined as "supporting and never
supplanting" party deliberation, communication and decisionmaking. There
is no suggestion in the Code's definitional language that the mediator has an
obligation to ensure fairness (between the parties and to outsiders), or to act
as guarantor of a fair outcome or agreement, or any agreement at all. Rather,
the mediator is the facilitator of party communication and decisionmaking,
wherever the communication and decisions may lead. Having noted this
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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general orientation of the Community Code, consider each of the mediator's
questions separately, as described earlier.
1. SHOULD THE MEDIATOR STATE EXPLICITLY TO JOSE AND
LILLY HIs/HER VIEW REGARDING THE RISKS TO RAFAELA
OF THE SLEEPING SCREEN ARRANGEMENT THEY ARE
AGREEING To?

.

Several provisions of the Community Code offer guidance on this
question, either directly or indirectly. The clearest guidance is stated in
Standard VI (Quality of the Process), which includes several "comments"
that offer specific ethical directives to the mediator. Comment 5 states that "a
mediator should strive to distinguish between the roles [of the mediator and
the professional advising a client and] ... should therefore refrain from
providing professional advice." 62 The Community Code's language does not
make a distinction between information and advice, although other codes do
so, but, in any event, the mediator's expression of her view could easily be
seen as giving advice.6 3 The reasonable conclusion would be that the
mediator is on more solid ground in withholding his/her view from Jose and
Lilly and allowing them to make the decision as they see fit.
This conclusion is strengthened when Standard VI Comment 5 is
read in conjunction with other provisions of the Community Code
emphasizing the respect mediators must show for party self-determination.
Thus Standard I (Self-Determination) states in mandatory language that "a
mediator shall conduct a mediation in a manner that supports party selfdetermination as to both process and outcome ... [meaning] that parties are
free to make voluntary and uncoerced procedural and substantive decisions
16" While most ethics codes include respect for self-determination as an
...
ethical requirement, many (including the Family Code) use more general and
less emphatic language. Read against the background of a substantial
literature documenting (and criticizing) mediator influence on parties as
coercive, the Community Code's language here sends a message that the
mediator should avoid ex ressing opinions that might have undue impact on
the parties' deliberations. 5 It certainly is far from the Family Code's explicit
62

Community Code, supra note 42, at Standard VI cmt. 5.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Community Code, supra note 42, at Standard I.
See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: The
"Problem" in Court-OrientedMediation, 15 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 863 (2008);
64
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permission for the mediator to offer "information that s/he is qualified by
training or expertise to provide."66 Again, the Community Code suggests that
the mediator is on more solid ground allowing the parties to decide on this
solution without stating his/her opinion explicitly to them.
A third provision that supports this conclusion is found in Standard
II (Impartiality). Standard II.A requires in mandatory language that "[a]
mediator shall .. . avoid conduct that gives the appearance of partiality
toward or prejudice against a party . . . in word, action or appearance." 67 The
emphasis on the appearanceof partiality makes it clear that the mediator
must be very careful about how his/her words may be understood by the
parties. In the Jose/Lilly case this is quite relevant, since the mediator's
opinion about the risks to Rafaela actually mirror the opinion originally
expressed by Jose. While the mediator's opinion is based on very different
grounds than Jose's, it might still appear that s/he is "siding" with him
against Lilly, giving the appearance of partiality.68 Some mediators have
suggested that almost any opinion or even information given by a mediator
in a contentious situation may be seen by one of the parties as "one-sided,"
regardless of the mediator's motivation.69 Again, the ethically sounder
response for the mediator in this case would be to refrain from explicitly
stating his/her negative view of the screen solution being reached by Jose
and Lilly.
A final provision in the Community Code that confirms this
conclusion is the language included in Standard I Comment 3 about
"informed choice." Some have argued that, when parties lack important
information that might affect their decision about an outcome, this itself
undermines party self-determination, so the mediator must take some steps to
ensure that the crucial information is not missing. 70 However, the language
Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision ofSelf-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Priceoflnstitutionalization?6 HARV. NEG. L. REv. 1 (2001).
Both articles document the frequency of mediators exerting pressure and coercion to
reach settlements and criticize this phenomenon.
Family Code, supra note 42, at Standard VI.B.
67 Community Code, supranote
42, at Standard II.A.
Note that impartiality (not favoring any one party) is different than neutrality
(not having a preference for a certain substantive outcome, for fairness reasons or
otherwise). See Stulberg, supra note 53.
6 See Bush, supra note 9, at 20-30; see also supra note 53.
70
See, e.g., Stulberg, supra note 33. Other commentators also argue that the
mediator is obligated to ensure that parties have critical information, without which
self-determination is a fiction. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed
Consent in Mediation:A Guiding Principlefor Truly EducatedDecisionmaking, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775 (1999) (arguing that informed consent is an essential
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of Standard I itself states that "self-determination means that parties are free
to make ... uncoerced decisions .. . including whether to make an informed
choice to agree or not agree." 7 1 The language here is somewhat ambiguous,
but arguably it can be read as supporting a party decision to make a choice
despite lacking certain information. This reading is supported by Standard I
Comment 3, which states clearly that "A mediator cannot personally ensure
that each party has made a fully informed choice to reach a particular
,,72
In other words, the mediator is not responsible for
agreement ....
guaranteeing "informed choice," because parties must be free to decide how
much information they need to reach a decision. Party self-determination
under the Community Code, in sum, requires the mediator to exercise great
restraint from any possible influence on the parties' decisions, even if s/he
thinks they are missing or overlooking important information. That suggests
again that the mediator in the Jose/Lilly case is on soundest footing in
keeping his/her own counsel regarding the screen solution and its possible
risks, because party self-determination is paramount.

2. EVEN IF THE MEDIATOR REFRAINS FROM DIRECTLY
EXPRESSING AN OPINIONABOUT THE SCREEN, SHOULD
S/HE AT LEAST QUESTION THE PARTIES ABOUT WHAT
Riss MIGHT BE ENTAILED, TO GET THEM TO CONSIDER
THOSE RISKS, WITHOUT STAT1NG His/HER VIEWS?
Although the Community Code discourages or prohibits the
mediator from directly expressing his/her concern about the screen solution,
s/he might wonder whether it is permissible and desirable to at least signal
the concern to the parties by posing questions to them about that solution. As
mediation experts have long noted, many mediators are skilled in using
questions as an indirect way of making suggestions about possible solutions
to a problem.73 Would such a strategy be considered ethical under the
Community Code? On initial examination, such questioning would not seem
to violate of any of the Community Code's provisions, although there is no

aspect of party self-determination and "[w]ithout it, mediation's promises of
autonomy and self-determination are empty.") Id. at 787-89, 840. See also Omer
Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions ofFairnessin Mediation, 54 S. TEX. L. REV.
281 (2012). See also infra note 100 (explaining what may seem to some like an
unduly strict interpretation here of the Code's provisions on this and other points).
71 Community Code, supra note 42, at Standard I.
72 Id at Standard I cmt.
3.
73 See Kolb & Kressel, supra note 23, at 468-70.
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provision of the Community Code that explicitly permits, encourages, or
requires the mediator (as does the Family Code) to raise the subject of risks
to Rafaela with the parties if neither of them has raised that subject.
However, a conservative reading of the Community Code's various
provisions suggests that questioning the parties in this way might well run
afoul of the Community Code's strong orientation toward preserving party
self-determination.
To return to the point made above regarding research on mediator
practices, questioning party proposals is a well-recognized method of
influencing parties toward or away from a solution preferred by the mediator.
As researcher Deborah Kolb puts it, for many mediators,
[Q]uestions become suggestions in the guise
of a query .. . [using the mediators']
expertise as the touchstone of their efforts at
persuasion and influence. These mediators
. . acknowledge that they make judgments
about what is a good and bad agreement and
try to influence the parties in the direction of
the good ....
Against this background, a mediator who asks questions about the risks to
Rafaela of the screen solution, when the parties have not raised such
questions themselves, runs his/her own risk of violating Standard I's
command to ensure that "parties are free to make voluntary and uncoerced .
substantive decisions ... .
Certainly, if the mediator's conduct were
challenged, s/he would have to admit that the very purpose of his/her
questions was to influence the parties away from the screen solution, and
such conduct would clearly violate Standard I's strong injunction to support
party self-determination.
One provision of the Code does seem to support the mediator's
raising questions on his/her own initiative. That is Standard II Comment 2,
on the necessity of maintaining impartiality "even while raising questions
regarding the reality, fairness, equity, durability and feasibility of proposed
options for resolution."76 This provision seems to contemplate the mediator
raising questions on her own for the parties to consider. However, the
implicit endorsement of mediator questions here seems somewhat anomalous
when read against the Community Code's insistence elsewhere that the
mediator avoid any action that could influence and limit party self-

74 Id.
7s

Community Code, supra note 42, at Standard I.

76 Id at Standard II cmt
2
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determination. Moreover, immediately following Comment 2, Comment 3
reaffirms that "The mediator's commitment is to remain impartial towards
the parties and their choices in the process . . . . "" That is, the mediator
must not show (or appear to show) partiality either to parties or to their
78
choices-like the choice of the screen solution. Where the questions asked
by the mediator have the effect of disfavoring a choice the parties are
making, as they would in the case here, it seems that the Community Code
would disallow as "partial" the very questions it seems to permit. Note also
that Comment 2's primary focus is on maintaining impartiality, not on
permitting mediator questions, which are mentioned only as examples of
how impartiality may be compromised. Therefore, read conservatively,
Comment 3 seems to trump Comment 2 and to indicate that mediator
79
questions are potential ethical landmines to be avoided.
In sum, the provisions of the Community Code taken together direct
the mediator to refrain from asking questions about risk "on her own
motion," where the parties have not introduced the subject themselves. The
sounder approach would be for the mediator to listen carefully for any
indication in their own comments that either Jose or Lilly has concerns about
the risks of the screen and then to reflect those comments for the parties.
That would support the discussion of risks to Rafaela at the parties' own
initiative, preserving rather than diluting self-determination. And that would
be the practice of a well-trained transformative mediator. But if the parties
raised no question about risks themselves, the mediator should seemingly not
raise the issue him/herself by asking questions, for doing so could violate the
mediator's duty to fully support, and not undermine, party selfdetermination.

Id. at Standard 11 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
7 See supranote 68 on the distinction between impartiality and neutrality. Here the
Community Code seems to be demanding neutrality, but the language is not clear.
7 Alternatively, these two comments may simply give inconsistent directions, which
is a common flaw in ethics codes. See WALDMAN, supra note 2. Standard principles of
interpretation suggest that, where there is inconsistency, the overall principle of the code
should determine which of two provisions to give greater effect-and if so, the principle
of self-determination would limit the seeming permission to raise questions in Comment
2.
77
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3. EVEN IFS/HE REFRAINS FROM QUESTIONING THE PARTIES
ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THEIR SCREEN SOLUTION,
SHOULD S/HE SUGGEST OR DEMAND THAT THEY GET
EXPERT ADVICE ABOUT THEIR IDEA BEFOREADOPTING

IT?

'

This question assumes that, in whatever discussion occurs between
them regarding the screen proposal, Jose and Lilly see no significant
downside for Rafaela. As discussed above, the mediator him/herself is not
permitted to provide information or advice, nor to ask questions in order to
provoke party consideration of risks to the child in their discussion.
Nevertheless, s/he remains concerned about the risks to Rafaela of the screen
solution, so s/he is contemplating another action: recommending that Jose
and Lilly get outside advice from a child/family counselor who is an
expert-thinking that this counselor will likely advise against the
arrangement. The answer to this is clear under the Community Code, and it is
close to the Family Code's answer.
Thus, even in Standard I with its seemingly absolute injunction to
support party choice and self-determination, Comment 3 qualifies its
statement that the mediator cannot ensure informed choice by adding that
"the mediator can make the parties aware that they may consult other
professionals to help them make informed choices .
,so In addition, in
Standard VI, after defining the mediator's role solely as "help[ing] the
parties communicate, negotiate and/or make decisions" and recommending
that "a mediator should . .. refrain from providing professional advice," 8
Comment 5 then adds that "where appropriate, a mediator should
recommend that parties seek outside professional advice ... . "82 Thus the
Code first permits the mediator to suggest obtaining outside advice with the
"can" language and then recommends such action with the "should"
formulation. Taking the two together, there seems to be little question that
the mediator is not only permitted but encouraged to make the
recommendation that s/he is contemplating here.
There is some inconsistency in the Community Code's endorsement
of mediators' recommending outside expert advice, for the recommendation
itself may suggest to the parties that their own choices are flawed in some
way. Like raising questions without directly expressing an opinion,
recommending consultation with outside experts would seem to be a signal
that the mediator disapproves of the choice the parties are making.
so Community Code, supra note 42, at Standard I cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at Standard VI cmt.5.
82 Id at Standard VI cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless the Community Code certainly views this step as acceptable
ethically.
However, taking the further step mentioned in Question 3, and
demanding that the parties seek outside advice, is not supported by the
language of the Community Code. There is no "shall" language used in
connection with this step, and if the mediator were to insist that the parties
get an outside expert opinion, doing so would almost certainly violate the
general injunction of Standard I to support the parties' "free[dom] to make
83
voluntary and uncoerced ... substantive decisions." And if the mediator
him/herself feels that making this recommendation is unduly burdensome on
the parties' self-determination, the Community Code does not require that
this be done-in contrast with the Family Code's mandate that "a family
mediator shall structure the ... process so that participants make decisions
84
based on sufficient information and knowledge" and that "a family
mediator shall assist participants in determining how to promote the best
interests of the child."8 5 So the Community Code encourages, but does not
require, the mediator to recommend seeking advice from experts outside the
process. Finally, if the parties decline to follow the mediator's
recommendation to seek outside advice, the Community Code does not
authorize the mediator to insist that they do so, because this would intrude on
their self-determination. This last point sets up discussion of the mediator's
fourth and most serious question.
4. FINALLY, IF THE PARTIES ARE SIMPLY NOT EXPRESSING,
CONCERNSABOUT THE RISKS TO RAFAELA ON THEIR OWN
WITHOUT DIRECT OR INDIRECT INPUTFROM THE

.

(AND

MEDIA TOR) AND THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN SEEKING
EXPERT AD VICE EVEN IF THE MEDIA TOR RECOMMENDS
DOING So, SHOULD THE MEDIA TOR ALLOW THEM TO
PROCEED WITH THEIR SCREEN IDEA AFTER ALL; OR
SHOULD S/IHE " VETO" THEIR PROPOSEDAGREEMENT
AND TERMINA TE THE MEDIATION?
Having answered Question 3 affirmatively, mediators or trainees
often assume that the dilemma is resolved-the mediator cannot express
his/her opinion, or even pose suggestive questions, but s/he can refer the

84

85

Id at Standard I.

Family Code, supranote 42, Standard VI (emphasis added).
Id at Standard VIII (emphasis added).
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parties to an outside expert who will hopefully "straighten them out." But
this ignores the very real possibility that Jose and Lilly will simply reject the
idea of seeking outside advice. Parents-and other parties to mediation-are
often leery of experts, as well as unwilling to bear additional costs, so
addressing the dilemma must include the final question of what, if anything,
to do, if Jose and Lilly reject the recommendation for getting outside advice
and just resolve to go ahead with the screen proposal without any concern for
its risks to Rafaela. As with a mediator working under the Family Code, this
is the toughest question involved in this situation under the Community
Code, since it assumes that the mediator still feels Rafaela is at risk but
believes that Jose and Lilly are either oblivious to that risk or
underestimating it. In fact, it is in addressing the toughest questions that an
ethical code reveals its underlying orientation. And it is here that the
Community Code, like the Family Code on the same question, gives the
clearest indication of what side of the value choice it ultimately weighs more
heavily.
It first appears that the Community Code does contemplate the
mediator's terminating the mediation session in certain circumstances,
despite Standard I's strong mandate to support the parties' freedom to make
their own choices. The "termination" language indeed appears in Standard I
itself, in Comment 4, and it also appears prominently in Standard VI, which
states clearly that "a mediator shall terminate the mediation . .. or take other
appropriate steps if she or he believes that participant conduct ...
jeopardizes sustaining a quality mediation process." 8 6 However, upon closer
examination it seems that the situation presented in the Jose/Lilly case does
not present the kind of circumstances the Community Code sees as justifying
overriding party choice and terminating a mediation.
In the several provisions of the Community Code recommending or
requiring termination of the session by the mediator, different reasons are
given to justify that extreme step. In Standard VI Comment 8, the
Community Code recommends (but does not require) termination by the
mediator if a party is incapable of understanding and participating in the
mediation process. 87 The Community Code does not elaborate, but its
language suggests its concern for the circumstance where a party has
diminished capacity either because of a mental impairment or because of
substance abuse. The Jose/Lilly cases does not present this circumstance, so
Comment 8 does not apply. Comment 10 of the same Standard recommends

8

8
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termination "if the mediation is being used to further illegal conduct" and is
also inapplicable to the Jose/Lilly case.
Beyond these two provisions, there are several others in which
termination is recommended or even required, and they all make reference to
the same justification-"power imbalances" between the parties. Standard I
Comment 4 recommends that "Where a power imbalance exists between the
parties ... the mediator should .. . terminate the mediation .... "89 Standard
VI Comment 11 observes that "a mediator has an ongoing obligation to be
sensitive to power imbalances between the parties" and recommends that if
such imbalances jeopardize sustaining a quality mediation process, "the
mediator should terminate the process." 90 This kind of concern for power
imbalances is very common in mediation literature, although it is usually
found in discussions of facilitative, not transformative, mediation.91
Therefore, it is somewhat surprising to see it in Community Code, which
overall reflects a transformative orientation. However, even by the common
definition of power imbalances--one party possessing more resources,
information, or bargaining power than the other-this kind of circumstance
is not presented in the Jose/Lilly case. As between Jose and Lilly themselves,
no such differential appears to exist, and the Community Code does not
address the impact on a vulnerable third party such as Rafaela.
Therefore, none of the Community Code's provisions that
recommend termination apply in the circumstances of the Jose/Lilly case.
Rather, in this situation where two relatively co-equal parties are making
what the mediator believes is a bad decision, even one that affects a child,
the mediator's concern for the child's welfare cannot override the obligation
92
to support the parties' self-determined choices about the solution.
Regarding the mediator's fourth question, then, the answer is that nothing in
the Community Code permits, recommends or requires the mediator to
terminate this session if Jose and Lilly have agreed on the screen solution for
Rafaela's sleeping arrangement. The mediator must accept their decision
without comment. The result could not be more different from that under the
Family Code.
Id at Standard VI cmt. 10.
Id at Standard I cmt. 4.
9 Id at Standard VI cmt. 11.
91 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
92 The same would be true, presumably, if the mediator was concerned that the "bad
decision" affected one of the parties themselves, where they were of relatively equal
power, or if the vulnerable party were an older person, etc. See Bush, supra note 9, at 2528.
8

89
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THE CODE'SDEFINITION OF "POWER IMBALANCE"

Apart from the answer to the mediator's last question, it is important
to note that the Code's commitment to supporting party self-determination is
even stronger than discussed thus far because of its unusually narrow
definition of "power imbalances." As noted, the common definition of a
power imbalance is a significant differential in bargaining power, etc. 93
However, the Community Code, including the footnotes and comments to
the Standards, uses a much narrower definition and uses it consistently
throughout the document. Thus, Standard I Comment 4 refers to "a power
imbalance [that] exists between the parties such that one or both parties
cannot exercise self-determination." 94 Then Footnote 7 to that Comment
explains that the indicators of such a power imbalance are "where one party
threatens, intimidates, or otherwise coerces the other party into . . . reaching

a desired result ... [.]",95 Similarly, in Standard VI Comment 11, referring to
power imbalances that jeopardize a quality process and justify termination,
Footnote 15 clarifies the definition of power imbalance in identical
language.9 6 In short, the Community Code's definition of power imbalances
is far narrower than the conventional definition, and essentially means the
presence of threatening and intimidating behavior directed by one party at
the other.
This narrow definition is confirmed further by the "Committee
Notes" by the Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee that are appended to the
Standards themselves. The Note to Standard I Comment 4, cited above as
recommending termination where a power balance exists, states:
The Committee recognizes that power
imbalances are an inherent part of mediation
between any two parties . . . [and] since the
issue of power concerns the fundamental
principle of self-determination the mediator
should be sensitive to any significant
challenge to a party's ability to freely and
willingly make decisions .... 97
However, the Note then continues, using the same language cited above from
Comment 4 itself,
See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
Community Code, supra note 42, at Standard I cmt. 4.
9s Id. at Standard I cmt. 4 n.7 (emphasis added).
9 Id at Standard VI cmt. 11 n.15.
94

97 Id at Committee Notes. note to Standard I cmt. 4-
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Such circumstances include where one party
is threatening, intimidatingor otherwise
manipulatingthe other party through either
words or actions. In those cases the
mediator should ... terminate the
mediation.98
In other words, the meaning of the term "power imbalance" in the
Community Code, according to its drafters, is not a differential in bargaining
power alone, but the actual exercise of intimidation by one party against the
other. This is a far narrower definition than the conventional one referring to
differential bargaining power. The Note to Standard VI Comment 11 uses
identical language in explaining when the principle of self-determination is
to be overridden. It seems likely that the Community Code's concern about
"power imbalances" refers primarily, though only implicitly, to cases
involving domestic violence or abuse, where intimidation, threat and
99
manipulation are often present, even if not openly revealed.
In short, the Community Code's commitment to party selfdetermination prevails and negates the mediator's authority to terminate a,
session, even where there is a power imbalance in the conventional sense--a
power differential-unlessthe stronger party is using that differential to
threaten, intimidate, or coerce the other. This is clearly not the situation in
the Jose/Lilly case, but this full examination of the Community Code's
provisions is meant to demonstrate the great weight the Community Code
assigns to the value of party self-determination.

6. SUMMARY
Thus, in analyzing the Community Code to find answers to the
specific questions that arise for the mediator in this case, it is clear that the
Code neither requires, recommends, or even permits the mediator to take
steps that would override or even influence, directly or indirectly, Jose and
Lilly's decision about the screen, other than recommending that they seek an
outside expert's view-and if they are not interested in doing so, the
mediator must accept their decision. All this, even though the mediator
sincerely believes that the screen solution puts Rafaela's welfare at risk.
Nevertheless, the mediator must privilege supporting the exercise of self98

Id (emphasis added).

99

See generally LUNDY BANCROFT, UNDERSTANDING THE BATTERER IN CUSTODY

AND VISITATION DISPUTES (1998), http://www.thelizlibrary.org/~Iiz/liz/understandingthe-batterer-in-visitation-and-custody-disputes.pdf.
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determination by the parents, Jose and Lilly, over protection of a vulnerable
child. The guidance is clear and consistent, giving the mediator a welldefined direction to take in addressing the dilemma presented. It is also clear
that this guidance is much more consistent with the transformative approach
to mediation than with the facilitative approach. From beginning (Standard I)
to end (Standard VI), the Community Code endorses the goal and strategies
of a well-trained transformative mediator-to support and never supplant
party self-determination, withholding any and all directive impulses and
instead following, attending to, and amplifying the parties' conversation in
ways that help them regain their own sense of competence and connection in
the midst of the conflict conversation, and relying on them to choose the best
outcome for themselves and their child.'0
100 This summary of the guidance given by the Community
Code in this case, and its

consonance with transformative mediation, may be disturbing or even shocking to some
readers, including mediators who follow the facilitative approach in their practice. How
can it possibly be ethically acceptable, they might ask, to leave a child at risk without
taking any significant steps to prevent that result? And indeed, as noted in the text, there
are possible readings of the Community Code's provisions that would permit the
mediator somewhat more room to raise questions or take other steps with the aim of
influencing the parents away from the screen solution. Why does the analysis in the text
take what seems to be a very strict interpretation of the Code's provisions? The answer to
these questions is in part rhetorical and in part substantive. Rhetorically, the aim of the
strict reading given here is to show that the Community Code can be read as consistently
privileging the self-determination value, although doing so may well put fairness and
even safety at risk. That is, this is a reasonable reading of the Code and does not stretch
the meaning of its provisions, especially when taken together. And this reading shows
that a genuinely self-determination-based ethics code is both possible and practical-and
that such a code is indeed in actual operation. This supports the argument made in this
Article for a pluralistic ethics framework, without which such a code might not be
considered viable. Beyond rhetoric, adopting a strict reading of the Code, with its clear
direction that the mediator must avoid taking steps that intrude on the parents' selfdetermination, brings home the real meaning of following a transformative approach to
practice. A transformative mediator will not be shocked by the Code's strict demands to
respect and support the parents' choices; rather, this respect and support will seem
completely proper to the mediator-and indeed the best way to achieve the goal of the
mediation process. This is so because the goal is not to reach an optimal and fair
agreement that protects against injustice. The goal is to support the parties' exercise of
their core human capacitiesfor autonomy and understanding. The underlying premise is
that the parties actually have and value those capacities and are extremely distressed that
the conflict has temporarily disabled them. With support from the mediator, they can
reclaim those core human capacities and make decisions for themselves that are good and
proper in their own judgment. In short, the transformative mediator's restrained and
supportive approach does not mean that s/he does not care about justice or protection; it
means that s/he trusts the parties to make decisions that are just and protective of
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V.

THE META-DILEMMA OF MEDIATION ETHICS AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS

-

From the extended analysis of how each of two mediation ethics
codes would answer a mediator's questions about the same dilemmasupport party self-determination or protect against unfairness or harm to a
vulnerable party-it is evident that the codes themselves confront the
practicing mediator with a meta-dilemma. That dilemma is faced squarely by
the lawyer family mediator practicing in community mediation center: S/he
is supposed to follow the guidance of two different codes, but the guidance
offered by each is opposite to that offered by the other in critical ways. As a
result, whatever course of action s/he takes, if it follows the direction of one
code, will almost surely put him/her at risk of violating the other code. What
should s/he do? There is no obvious answer to that question.
At a higher level, what of those charged with drafting and
implementing these regulatory guides for mediators? If they choose to model
their standards on the Family Code, they exclude transformative practitioners
from practice in their jurisdiction. While if they model their standards on the
Community Code, they put facilitative mediators on notice that their
practices will not be accepted by the jurisdiction. The meta-dilemma, in
short, is faced both by individual practitioners and by the authorities that
promulgate standards to guide their practice. Whatever choice of standards is
made, it will disfavor or exclude one group of practitioners, and favor and
privilege another group. How can this meta-dilemma be resolved? In fact,
there are several different approaches to doing so, and they will be described
and considered in this Part of the Article.

A. Unitary Standards
The obvious way of resolving the meta-dilemma is simply to choose
one of the competing underlying values-protection versus selfdetermination-as the supreme value and adopt a code that privileges that
value. That would mean adopting either a code similar to the Family Code,
on the one hand, or one similar to the Community Code, on the other. Each
themselves, each other, and other affected parties. This is not just theory; these principles
are embedded in the actual work of the transformative mediator, and they explain and
justify his/her ready acceptance of the ethical guidance given by a code like the
Community Code, even when it is read strictly as in this Article. See BUSH & FOLGER,
supra note 1, at ch. I & 7 and sources cited there (fully explaining and justifying these
and other elements of a transformative mediator's outlook).
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of those codes, as analyzed above, consistently privileges one of the two
values, and thus takes a unitary approach. The effect of doing so, as noted
above, is to put one group of mediators on notice that they must either
change their mode of practice, or risk being in violation of the ethics code
that regulates them. Policymakers are certainly entitled to follow such an
approach. However, at a stage when mediation practice has arguably not
crystallized into a single mold but is still developing, the unitary solution
may be unduly restrictive to that development. Nevertheless, until recently it
appears to have been the most prevalent solution. The Family (ABA) and
Community (New York State) Codes analyzed above are both examples of
the unitary approach, but there are numerous others-some favoring
protection and the facilitative approach, and some favoring selfdetermination and the transformative approach. Consider the following
examples.
1.

PROTECTION-BASED CODES

Codes that favor the protection value would resolve the questions of
the Jose/Lilly case in a similar fashion to the Family Code discussed above,
as an analysis of the provisions of each code suggests. Note that most of
these codes include a provision endorsing self-determination as "a core
principle" of mediation. Nevertheless, the codes' provisions contemplate
overriding that principle when it conflicts with the concern for avoiding
unfairness.

a. Indiana Court Rules for Alternative Dispute
Resolution.o'
The Indiana Court Rules for ADR ("Indiana Rules") incorporate
ethics rules for multiple ADR processes, including mediation. Regarding
mediation in particular, the Indiana Rules are notable in not mentioning
anywhere the term "self-determination," which is cited as a core principle in
almost all mediation ethics codes. The Indiana Rules do contain a few
provisions bearing on party self-determination, such as: "A neutral
[mediator] shall not coerce any party,"' 0 2 and "[a] neutral [mediator] shall
not make any substantive decision for any party."' 0 3 However, the Indiana

lot RULES FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (IND. RULES
OF COURT 2019),

https://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/adr/#Toc470860707.
Id. at r. 7.5(A).
103 Id at r. 7.5(C).
102
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Rules otherwise stress protective obligations of the mediator. Some
provisions make the mediator responsible for the fairness of the process: "A
neutral [mediator] shall promote mutual respect among the participants
throughout the process";104 and "The mediator shall . . . in child related
matters, ensure that the parties consider fully the best interests of the children
and that the parties understand the consequences of any decision they reach
concerning the children ... [.]"'o Other provisions go further and make the
mediator responsible for preventing unfair outcomes: "The mediator shall

terminate or decline mediation whenever the mediator believes that: the
mediation process would harm or prejudice one or more of the parties or the
children; [or] the ability or willingness of any party to participate
meaningfully in mediation is so lacking that a reasonable agreement is
1 06
unlikely; .. . or mediation is inappropriate for other reasons." Finally, the
Indiana Rules require that "A neutral [mediator] shall withdraw whenever a
proposed resolution is unconscionable."' 0 7 Taken together, these provisions
make it clear that these ethics Indiana Rules exemplify a unitary code based
on the value of protection against unfairness, even at the expense of selfdetermination.
b. NYSDRA Standardsof Ethics10 8
Another code that takes a unitary approach and favors the facilitative
approach is the original code adopted by the New York State Dispute
Resolution Association ("NYSDRA Code") (still in effect as of 2005 but
since replaced by the Model Standards discussed below). The NYSDRA
Code explicitly refers to itself as a code for facilitative mediators:
"Facilitative mediation is a process chosen by disputing parties, in which an
impartial third party provides an opportunity for constructive deliberation,
problem solving, and decision making by the parties. Based on the principles
of self-determination, fairness and privacy, the mediator facilitates
communication in a way that makes it possible for each party to gain greater
clarity of perspectives, preferences, issues, goals, and options; from which

1"

Id at r. 7.4(F).

'o' Id at r. 2.7(A)(2).
1'0
107

Id at r. 2.7(D)(1).
Id at r. 7.5(B).

1o8 NEW YORK STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASSOCIATION, MEDIATOR STANDARDS

OF PRACTICE (2005) (on file with author) (since superseded by adoption of Model
Standards).
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the parties can find and implement mutually acceptable terms of
resolution." 09 The language identifies the fundamental principles as "selfdetermination and fairness," without clearly indicating which is to take
precedence if they conflict. However, this question is resolved by later
provisions. Standard F instructs mediators that they "shall respect [the
parties' right of self-determination] and act in ways to encourage parties that
they are free to decide for themselves without outside compulsion .. . and
should not act in any way that will compromise the parties' rights to selfdetermination."o But Standard 1.3 states that "the mediator should structure
the sessions in a way that will allow participants to make decisions about the
dispute based on as much information as possible," 11' assigning the mediator
responsibility for ensuring parties have adequate information, a protective
provision. In Standard E.1, mediators are told they are also responsible for
the fairness of the process and should therefore "provide all parties with a
balanced opportunity for full expression of their needs, interests, issues,
perceptions, common grounds and options for mutually acceptable
resolutions."ll 2 This provision is linked to one requiring mediators to become
educated about domestic violence and abuse, suggesting that the "full
expression" standard is aimed at protecting against unfairness in such
situations as well as otherwise.
Finally, the clearest indication that the NYSDRA Code views
protection against unfairness as primary is found in Standard D, on
"Suspension or Termination."1 3 This Standard says that a mediator shall
suspend or terminate the session when "one or more or the participants is not
participating in good faith or is abusing the mediation process," or "one party
has substantially more resources and/or bargaining power and the other party
does not seem to fully comprehend the process, issues, or options, or is
acting under fear or coercion," or "the mediator believes that a participant is
unable or unwilling to participate effectively in the mediation process" 1 l 4
all of which are provisions aimed at protecting against unfairness in process
or outcome, even though they all limit party self-determination in some
measure. Thus, the NYSDRA Code also presents a unitary ethical framework
that places protection against unfairness foremost in its guidance to
mediators.

'0

1

Id at Standard A.
1Id at Standard F.
Id at Standard 1.3.

112

in
114
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c.

OntarioBar Association (CBAO) Model Code of
Conductfor Mediators"'

The Ontario Bar Association (CBAO) Model Code of Conduct for
Mediators ("CBAO Code") contains provisions having the clear effect of
placing priority on protection over party self-determination. The CBAO
Code governs Ontario mediators working under the Mandatory Mediation
Program in Ottawa, Toronto, and Windsor. The CBAO Code begins with a
section mandating mediator respect for party self-determination, but it is
followed by other sections mandating considerable mediator decisionmaking
power over questions of both process and potential outcome, for the sake of
ensuring fairness.
Standard II states that "the mediator's role . .. is to assist and
encourage parties to a dispute: to communicate and negotiate in good faith
with each other; to identify and convey their interests to one another; to
assess risks; to consider possible settlement options; and to resolve
voluntarily their dispute.',l6 A subsequent standard requires the mediator
"ensure that they conduct a process which provides parties with the
opportunity to participate in the mediation and which encourages respect
among the parties,"" 7 in effect making the mediator the guarantor of a fair
process. Beyond this concern for process fairness, the CBAO Code
authorizes the mediator to suspend the mediation "if in their opinion: the
process is likely to prejudice one or more of the parties; one or more of the
parties is using the process inappropriately; one or more of the parties is
delaying the process to the detriment of another party or parties; the
mediation process is detrimental to one or more of the parties or the
mediator; it appears that a party is not acting in good faith; or there are other
reasons that are or appear to be counterproductive to the process.""' Finally,
the CBAO Code requires mediators to "terminate mediation if the[se]
9
conditions are not rectified."ll This standard reinforces the mediator's role
as protector from unfairness not only of process but outcome as well. In sum,

115 MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT (ONT. MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GEN.

2018),

https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/manmed/codeofconduct.php.
"'Id at Standard II.
117 Id at Standard VII.2.
"8 Id at Standard XI.3.
"9 Id at Standard XI.4.
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under the CBAO Code the mediator has a clear obligation to ensure fairness,
without regard to party self-determination.

d.

Virginia Standards ofEthicsfor Certified
MediatorS120

The Virginia Standards of Ethics for Certified Mediators ("Virginia
Standards"), while including the usual provision endorsing party selfdetermination, give clear priority to protection against unfairness. Like most
of the protection-based codes, the Virginia Standards state that "[m]ediation
is based on the principle of self-determination by the parties."l 2 1 At the same
time, the Virginia Standards permit the mediator several typical directive
interventions regarding substantive issues ("The mediator may provide
information and raise issues. . . . The mediator may suggest and explore
options for the parties to consider . .
122) and regarding the process itself
("The mediator shall promote a balanced process and shall encourage the
participants to participate in the mediation in a collaborative, non-adversarial
manner."l 23).
These provisions are followed by others that are more clearly
oriented toward rights protection: "The mediator shall encourage the parties
to obtain independent expert information and/or advice when such
information and/or advice is needed to reach an informed agreement or to
protect the rights of a party."l2 4 The mandatory language indicates the
importance placed on protecting against unfairness. Still more emphasis on
protection is evident in the Standard addressing agreements reached by the
parties:
Prior to the parties entering into a mediated
agreement, the mediator shall encourage the
parties to consider the meaning and
ramifications of the agreement and the
interests of any third parties. The mediator
shall encourage review of any agreement by
120 STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR

CERTIFIED MEDIATORS (Sup. Ct. Va. 2011),

http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/stand
ards.html [hereinafter Va. Rules].
121 Id at Standard
E.1.
122 Id at Standard
E.2.
123 Id at Standard
E.4.
124 Id. at Standard F. 1
(emphasis added).
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independent legal counsel for each of the
parties prior to the mediated agreement
being signed by the parties. If the mediator
has concerns about the possible
consequences of a proposed agreement or
that any party does not fully understand the
terms of the agreement or its consequences,
the mediator may raise these concerns with
the parties and may withdraw from the
mediation.125
Finally, the Virginia Standards include strong protective language
regarding the mediator's obligation to terminate the process to avoid
unfairness: "The mediator shall terminate the mediation when, in the
mediator's judgment, the integrity of the process has been compromised.
(For example, by inability or unwillingness of a party to participate
effectively; gross inequality of bargaining power or ability; and unfairness
resulting from nondisclosure, where there is a legal duty to disclose, or
fraud, by a participant.)"1 2 6 Overall, the Virginia Standards place a clear
priority on avoiding unfairness, permitting and obligating the mediator to
take steps to do so even if they undermine or override party selfdetermination.
2.

SELF-DETERMNATION-BASED CODES

Codes that favor the self-determination value would resolve the
questions of the Jose/Lilly case in a similar fashion to the Community Code
discussed above, as an analysis of the provisions of each code suggests. In
these codes, the endorsement of self-determination as a principle does not
stand alone but is followed up by specific provisions that enact that
principle.
a.

The Model Standardsof Conductfor

MediatoTs127

The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators ("Model
Standards") are a well-known and influential set of model ethical standards,
jointly drafted and adopted in 2005 by three major organizations: the
125 Id
12 6

at Standard 1.1-3.
Id at Standard K.4.

127 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS,

(AM.

BAR ASS'N ET

AL., 2005), https://www.mediate.com/articles/model-standardsofconflict.cfm

[hereinafter Model Standards].
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American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the
Association for Conflict Resolution. While they themselves have no
binding authority, they have served as the basis for authoritative codes in
many jurisdictions-including the Community Code analyzed earlier,
which was based in large part on the Model Standards.
The Model Standards define mediation as "a process in which an
impartial third party facilitates communication and negotiation and
promotes voluntary decision making by the parties to the dispute."1 2 8 This
puts party decisionmaking at the core of the process. The Model Standards
continue with a strong statement regarding the mediator's obligation to
support party self-determination:
A mediator shall conduct a mediation based
on the principle of party self-determination.
Self-determination is the act of coming to a
voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each
party makes free and informed choices as to
process and outcome. Parties may exercise
self-determination at any stage of a
mediation, including mediator selection,
process design, participation in or
withdrawal from the process, and
outcomes. 12 9
This provision requires mediator support for self-determination not
only on outcome but on all process matters as well.
The Model Standards then clarify that "a mediator cannot
personally ensure that each party has made free and informed choices to
reach particular decisions,"130 thus removing from the mediator the duty
to protect against uninformed party decisionmaking. The Model
Standards do recommend-but do not require-that "where
appropriate, a mediator should make the parties aware of the
importance of consulting other professionals to help them make
informed choices.""'3 Thus, while there is some recognition of the
fairness concern, decisions on information are ultimately left to the
parties.
Finally, Standard VI, regarding the duty to ensure a "quality
128

Id at Preamble.

Id at Standard I.A.
"o Id. Standard I.A.2.
131 Id at Standard
I.A.2.
129
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process," imposes a duty to postpone or terminate the process only for
limited reasons: "[I]f a party appears to have difficulty comprehending
the process, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty participating in a
mediation,"1 32 "if a mediator is made aware of domestic abuse or
mdao eivsta
,,133
or "if a mediator believes that
violence among the parties,
participant conduct, including that of the mediator, jeopardizes
1 34
conducting a mediation consistent with these [Model] Standards."
The last of these three seems to be a catch-all provision, but it is
noteworthy that no specific mention is made of a situation of "power
imbalance" between the parties, nor is there any reference to
terminating due to an "unconscionable agreement" or other substantive
unfairness in the outcome. Indeed, the Model Standards' formulation of
the duty to terminate puts stricter limits on the mediator than the
Community Code analyzed above, which does refer to "power
imbalances" as a ground for termination, although from the Community
Code's definition of such imbalances, it seems likely, as discussed
135
earlier, that this applies only in cases like domestic violence. Still, the
Model Standards are more precise in this regard, and provide no
explicit protection against "power imbalances."
In sum, the Model Standards seem to present a strong example
of a unitary code that privileges party self-determination over
protection. However, there are several provisions of the Model
Standards that suggest a dual focus on both values, as discussed in the
following Section.

b.

Codes Based on the Model Standards

As mentioned above, the Model Standards themselves carry no
binding authority. However, they have been adopted in binding form by
136
several jurisdictions. For example, the Community Code analyzed
above in Part H of this Article was based largely on the Model
Standards, although there are some differences as discussed below.
Also, NYSDRA adopted the Model Standards in full as its revised
codes of ethics. In doing so, it moved from its original unitary

132

Id at Standard VI.A.10.

133

Id at Standard VI.B.

134

Id at Standard VI.C.

See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
See Exon, supra note 19, for a comprehensive discussion of ethics codes in
different jurisdictions, noting which ones are based on the Model Standards.
135

136
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protection-based ethics standards (discussed above) to largely selfdetermination-based standards-quite a significant shift for
practitioners and regulators alike, and a testimony to the influence of
the Model Standards.
3.

THE PROBLEM WITH UNITARY STANDARDS

Whether based on the protection value or the self-determination
value, unitary codes face the same problem. They do not accommodate
practitioners of both facilitative and transformative mediation.
Protection-based codes require conduct that transformative mediators
are trained to avoid and prohibit conduct that they are trained to enact.
Self-determination-based codes would require conduct that facilitative
mediators are trained to avoid and prohibit conduct they are trained to
enact. In unitary code jurisdictions, one group of mediators is
effectively excluded from practice, because their basic methods are
branded as unethical by the codes that regulate mediators in that
jurisdiction. One response to this meta-dilemma is to construct codes
intended to include both models of practice, as discussed in the next
Section.
B. Combination Standards
Some ethics standards, to avoid the exclusion problem just
mentioned, are drafted to include and accommodate both models of
mediation. At least, that is the apparent reason underlying the content of
these codes.
1.

THE MODEL STANDARDS

As noted above, the Model Standards are largely focused on
party-self-determination and generally prioritize this value above
protection. However, there are a few places where provisions in the
Model Standards seem more protection-based. For example, the
Standards state, "A mediator may provide information that the mediator
is qualified by training or experience to provide." 37 This provision,
often found in protective codes,13 8 explicitly permits the mediator to use
information that may be intended to influence party decisionmaking, or
may have the effect of doing so.
m Model Standards, supra note 127, at Standard VI.A.5.
1 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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Further, the Model Standards include the provision that "[a]
mediator shall conduct a mediation in accordance with these [Model]
Standards and in a manner that promotes diligence, timeliness, safety,
presence of the appropriate participants, party participation, procedural
fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all
1 39
This mandatory provision seemingly obligates the
participants."
mediator to monitor whether the process that unfolds in the session is
"fair" and "mutually respectful." The mediator is thus obliged to be the
guarantor of fairness and respect, which may require him/her to control
or manage the parties' conversation in a way that limits party choices
about how to address one another. This is a provision typically found in
protection-based codes, 140 and one more consonant with the facilitative
mediation model in which the mediator is expected to manage and
"balance" the conversation.
These provisions in the Model Standards are not found in the
Community Code, analyzed earlier. The Community Code does not
directly refer to or permit mediator information-giving, nor does it place
on the mediator an obligation to guarantee fairness and mutual respect in
the parties' conversation. In this sense, the Model Standards appear, to
some extent at least, to prioritize both self-determination and protection,
which this Article characterizes as a "combination" code. And, in this
sense, the Community Code presents a better example of a unitary selfdetermination-based code-perhaps the best example of such a code,
even though it is based in part on the Model Standards. This is why it
was chosen in this Article for the analysis presented earlier.
Despite the provisions discussed here, which might suggest that
the Model Standards are a "combination" code, the Model Standards are
very largely focused on the mediator's duty to preserve and support
party self-determination, which is why this code was included in the
previous Section. However, the potential internal conflict inherent in a
combination code makes it important to note that it is less than fully
unitary in its orientation. Other codes present a similar picture, while still
others are more clearly trying to include both values in their provisions.

139
140

Model Standards, supra note 127, at Standard VI.A (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 101-14.
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NORTH CAROLINA STANDARDS OFPROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR MEDIA TORSl 4 1

The North Carolina Standards of Professional Conduct for Mediators
("N.C. Standards") are a kind of mirror image of the Model Standards, in
terms of presenting a combination code. That is, most of the N.C. Standards'
provisions are oriented toward protection and avoiding unfairness, but the
code also includes some provisions clearly directed at supporting party selfdetermination. Below are several examples of its protection-oriented
provisions.

As in other protection-based codes, the N.C. Standards permit a
mediator to "raise questions for the participants to consider regarding
their perceptions of the dispute as well as the acceptability of proposed
options for settlement and their impact on third parties."1 4 2 However, the
N.C. Standards go further and permit mediators to "suggest for
consideration options for settlement in addition to those conceived of by
the parties themselves." 4 3 In both provisions, the N.C. Standards permit
mediator actions that may undermine self-determination and influence
party decisionmaking, whether for fairness or other reasons.
The N.C. Standards go still further and permit "the mediator's
expression of an opinion as a last resort to a party or attorney who
requests it and the mediator has already helped that party utilize his/her
own resources to evaluate the dispute and options."l4 4 The N.C. Standards
also state that "a mediator shall inform the parties of the importance of
seeking legal, financial, tax or other professional advice before, during or
after the mediation process."1 4 5 Again, these provisions seem designed to
avoid the "negative impact" of poor party decisionmaking, meanwhile
undermining self-determination in order to ensure fair and "quality"
outcomes.
Finally, the N.C. Standards include provisions similar to those of
other protection-based codes that make the mediator a guarantor of the
fairness of both process and outcome, such as the following: "A mediator
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure a balanced discussion and to
141 REVISED STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS

(SUP. CT. N.C. 2014),

https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/StandardsConduct.pdf
?e2dD2UQUqwN6Ypo3wEFy3CtHORzZzp8r.
142 Id at r. V.B.
143 Id
144

Id at r. V.C.

145 Id. at r. IV.D.
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prevent manipulation or intimidation by either party and to ensure that
each party understands and respects the concerns and position of the other
even if they cannot agree." 14 6 Moreover,
If a mediator believes that the statements
or actions of any participant, including
those of a lawyer who the mediator
believes is engaging in or has engaged in
professional misconduct, jeopardize or
will jeopardize the integrity of the
mediation process, the mediator shall
attempt to persuade the participant to
cease his/her behavior and take remedial
action. If the mediator is unsuccessful in
this effort, s/he shall take appropriate
steps including, but not limited to,
postponing, withdrawing from or
147
terminating the mediation.
All of the foregoing provisions indicate prioritization of the value
of avoiding unfairness or bad quality outcomes. However, the N.C.
Standards also include a few provisions that seem oriented instead to
supporting self-determination. Among these: "A mediator shall respect
and encourage self-determination by the parties in their decision whether,
and on what terms, to resolve their dispute and shall refrain from being
directive and judgmental regarding the issues in dispute and options for
settlement." 48 This is a stronger statement than many codes offer,
making respect for party-self-determination mandatory, and giving some
concrete definition to what this duty entails.
Further, the N.C. Standards state that "if a party to a mediation
declines to consult an independent counsel or expert after the mediator
has raised this option, the mediator shall permit the mediation to go
forward according to the parties' wishes." 149 Thus the parties are free to
reject the mediator's suggestion of consulting outside experts, and the
mediator must accept their decision.

Id
Id
148 Id
149 Id
146
147

at r.
at r.
at r.
at r.

VIII.A.
VII.B.
V.
V.D.
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'

Finally, the N.C. Standards require that "a mediator shall not
impose his/her opinion about the merits of the dispute or about the
acceptability of any proposed option for settlement. A mediator should
resist giving his/her opinions about the dispute and options for settlement
even when he/she is requested to do so by a party or attorney. Instead, a
mediator should help that party utilize his/her own resources to evaluate
the dispute and the options for settlement."150 Again, the N.C. Standards
insist on the mediator refraining from statements that could influence
party decisionmaking, particularly when this influence is intentional.
These several provisions inject a measure of priority for selfdetermination into a code largely oriented toward protection against
unfairness. This is why the N.C. Standards can be called a combination
code, and it suggests the problem inherent in such codes: The provisions
favoring protection often conflict with those favoring self-determination,
casting the mediator into new dilemmas instead of guiding him/her
through them. 15
3.

GEORGIA COMMISSION ON DISPUTERESOLUTION
ETHICAL STANDARDSl 52

The Georgia Commission on Dispute Resolution Ethical
Standards ("Georgia Standards") are a very clear example of a code that
tries to take both values-protection and self-determination-into
account. The Georgia Standards begin with an introduction that provides
one of the strongest statements of the self-determination value found in
any code yet joins it to the protection value:
[E]thical standards for mediators can be
most easily understood in the context of the
... fundamental promises that the mediator
makes to the parties in explaining the
process: 1) the mediator will protect the self
determination of the parties . . .. Besides
maintaining fidelity to these principles, a
mediator acts as guardian of the overall
fairness of the process.

`s Id at r. V.C.
IsI See WALDMAN, supra note 2, at 9-14.
152 ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR NEUTRALS (GA. COMM'N ON DISPUTE RES. 2013), app.

C, ch. 1, http://godr.org/content/mediator-ethics-information.
15
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Clearly, the Georgia Standards value both self-determination and protection.
The commentary to this statement stresses the commitment to selfdetermination:
Commentary: The Georgia Commission on
Dispute Resolution accepts the proposition
that self-determination of the parties is the
most criticalprinciple underlying the
mediationprocess. Control of the outcome
by the parties is the source of the power of
the mediationprocess. Further, it is the
characteristicwhich may lead to an
outcome superiorto an adjudicated
outcome. Self-determination is a difficult
goal in our society in which people seem
often unwilling to assume responsibilityfor
their own lives, anxiousfor someone else to
make the decisionsfor them. Mediation is
154
antitheticalto this attitude.
In a further part of the Georgia Standards on self-determination, the
same effort to include both self-determination and protection as ethical
values is evident:
Self-determination includes the ability to
bargain for oneself alone or with the
assistance of an attorney. Although the
mediator has a duty to make every effort to
address a power imbalance, this may be
impossible. At some point the balance of
power may be so skewed that the mediation
should be terminated ....
Recommendation: . .. If one party is simply
unable to bargainas effectively as another,
it is probably inappropriateto deny those
partiesthe benefits of the mediation process
because of thatfactor. If the imbalance
occurs because ofdisparity in the ability of
the parties'attorneys, the principle ofself-

154

Id at Standard I (Commentary).
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determination, in this case in relation to the
selection of an attorney, againprevails.55
Once again, the very same standard instructs the mediator to uphold both
protection and self-determination. Still further the Georgia Standards address
advice-giving, and in this provision self-determination seems paramount:
It is improper for lawyer/mediator,
therapist/mediator, or mediator who has any
professional expertise in another area to
offer professional advice to a party. If the
mediator feels that a party is acting without
sufficient information, the mediator should
raise the possibility of the party's consulting
an expert to supply that information ....
Recommendation: The line between
information and advice can be very difficult
to find. However, failure to honor the maxim
that a mediator never offers professional
advice can lead to an invasion of the
parties'rightto self-determinationand a
real or perceived breach ofneutrality.56
Beyond these provisions stressing both values, the Georgia
Standards emphasize directly the mediator's obligation to ensure the fairness
of both process and outcome, but even here the Standards include reference
to self-determination:
The mediator is the guardian of fairness of
the process. In that context, the mediator
must assure that the conference is
characterized by overall fairness and must
protect the integrity of the process. A
mediator should not be a party to an
agreement which is illegal or impossible to
execute. The mediator should alert parties to
the effect of the agreement upon third
parties who are not part of the mediation ...
. A mediator may refuse to draft or sign an
agreement which seems fundamentally
unfair to one party....
This standard includes the following recommendation:

514

155

Id at Standard .B.

156

Id at Standard I.E.
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Id at Standard IV.A.
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"Recommendation: The mediator'stension
may resultfrom his or her concern that the
agreement is not the best possible
agreement. On the other end of the
continuum the mediatorfeels that the
agreement is unconscionable. This is an
area in which the mediator's sense of
fairness may collide with the fundamental
principle of self-determination of the
parties. On the other end of the continuum,
the mediator may feel that the agreement is
unfair in that one party is not fully informed.
In other words, the process by which
agreement was reached was unfair because
one party was not bargainingfrom a
position of knowledge. An underlying
question is whose yardstick should be used
in measuringfairness.... If. .. the
mediator is convinced that the agreement is
so unfair that he or she cannot participate,
the mediator should withdraw without
drafting the agreement.... Parties should
be informed that they are, of course, free to
enter into any agreement that they wish
notwithstandingthe withdrawal of the
58

mediator.

This lengthy provision strongly stresses the obligation to protect against
unfairness but still includes the competing value of self-determination.
Together with the provisions cited above, it is a clear example of a
"combination code," and it suggests the difficulty mediators face in trying to
adhere to the inherently conflicting directions of such a code.
4. NEBRASKA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY
59
MEDIA TORS1

158

Id

159 NEBRASKA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE AND ETHICS FOR FAMILY

MEDIATORS, (SUP. CT. NEB. 2008),

https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/sites/default/files/Programs/mediation/nesta
ndardsandethicsfor family mediators.pdf [hereinafter Nebraska Standards].
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The Nebraska Standards of Practice for Family Mediators
("Nebraska Family Standards") are notable for the extent to which they
borrow from both kinds of unitary codes-protection-based and selfdetermination-based. The effect is a more truly combination code, but it is
also to create more confusion for mediators about what they should do in
situations like the one in the Jose/Lilly case.
The Nebraska Family Standards begin with "General Principles,"
which state that the mediator "assists the participants without coercion or the
appearance of coercion to define and clarify issues and interests, reduce
obstacles to communication, explore possible solutions, and where desired,
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Party self-determination is a core
value of mediation, in which the decision-making authority rests with the
participants themselves."' 60 This introduction then explains:
In mediation, decision-making authority
rests with the disputing parties. [The
mediator's] role may include, but is not
limited to, assisting the parties to identify
issues, help the parties in conflict to talk to
and listen to each other, facilitate
communication, focus on each other's needs
and interests, maximize the exploration of
alternatives or options, and to support the
parties to voluntarily achieve resolution of
the problem.16 1
The Nebraska Family Standards thus begin with a clear emphasis on selfdetermination.
Following this introduction, the first standard addresses the core
element of self-determination, and it does so in terms taken almost verbatim
from the Model Standards:
A family mediator shall conduct a mediation
based on the principle of party selfdetermination. Self- Determination is the act
of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced
decision in which each party makes free and
informed choices as to process and outcome.
Parties may exercise self-determination at
all stages of mediation, including mediator
160

Id. at general princ. B.

Id. at general princ. C.
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selection, process design, the nature of their
162
participation in the process, and outcomes.
This language is the broadest used by any code, including not only outcome
but process decisions throughout the mediation session. It would seem to
limit mediator intrusion on party decisionmaking of any kind. The Nebraska
Family Standards then add that "a mediator cannot personally ensure that
each party has made free and informed choices to reach particular decisions,
but, where appropriate, a mediator should make the parties aware of the
importance of consulting other professionals to help them make informed
choices." 1 6 3 Again, this language is the clearest used by any code to stress that
the parties are also free to decide how much information they need, and the
mediator is not the guarantor of "informed choice." Standard I concludes by
requiring the mediator to "inform the participants that they may withdraw
from family mediation, after attendance at any legally required sessions, at
any time and are not required to reach an agreement in mediation."'1 All in
165
sends a
all, this standard, borrowed from self-determination-based codes,
that
However,
self-determination.
party
of
primacy
the
of
message
strong
of
number
by
a
contradicted,
not
if
diluted,
is
soon
seemingly clear message
other provisions with a clearly protective character.
Thus, despite Standard I's strong command to mediators to support
party self-determination, Standard VI requires that "[a] family mediator
shall structure the mediation process so that the participants make decisions
based on self-determination [and] will support the participants' efforts to
gain sufficient information and knowledge. . .. "166 In furtherance of that
requirement, "The family mediator shall support the participants' efforts to
fully and accurately disclose, acquire and develop information during
67
mediation so that the participants can make informed decisions."
Furthermore, "a mediator may provide the participants with information that
the mediator is qualified by training or experience to provide."l 68 Finally,
though not a requirement, "The mediator should inform the participants that
69
any agreement should be reviewed by an attorney before it is finalized."l
Thus, having guaranteed parties no interference by the mediator in their
162

161
'
1
1

167
168
16

Id at Standard I.A.
Id at Standard .C.
Id at Standard I.F.
See supra text accompanying notes 127, 135.
Nebraska Standards, supra note 159, at Standard VI.

Id
Id at Standard VI.B.
Id at Standard VI.D.
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decisionmaking in Standard I, the Nebraska Family Standards permit and
require in Standard VI considerable interference to ensure "adequate
information and knowledge," a clearly protection-based provision.
Not surprisingly, since this is a code for family mediators, the
Nebraska Family Standards continue to introduce protective provisions
related to the "best interests of the child." Standard VIII requires the
mediator to "support each party to consider the needs of each child and how
to promote the child's best interests."' 70 This includes "encourag[ing] the
parties to seek expert advice in the area of child development to facilitate a
parenting plan that is appropriate to the child [which] should take into
account the child's health, emotional wellbeing, care and safety while
promoting stability and continuity to the greatest extent possible." 7 ' in
addition, the "mediator should assist the parties in anticipating areas of
potential conflict as the parties create a parenting plan [and] the mediator
should encourage the parties to develop a plan to revise the plan as the needs
of the 'child change."1 7 2 In short, the Nebraska Family Standards require and
recommend a good deal of advice-giving by the mediator, at least regarding
what the parties should consider, if not the specific decisions they should
make. This departs quite a bit from the principle of full freedom of party
choice on all matters of outcome and process. It is noteworthy, in this
regard, that Standard II of the Nebraska Family Code requires mediators to
have training that includes the subjects of family law, family systems, child
development, and other material that suggests the use of this information by
the mediator to help-that is, to influence-the parents in making decisions,
about the child and otherwise.1 73
Finally, the Nebraska Family Standards adopt almost verbatim, as
grounds for terminating a mediation, the factors listed in the ABA Family
Code, analyzed earlier in this Article,1 74 including, among other
circumstances: "the safety of a participant or well-being of a child is
threatened; the participants are about to enter into an agreement that the
mediator reasonably believes to be unconscionable; or a participant is using
the mediation process to gain an unfair advantage." 1 75 The power, if not the
requirement, for a mediator to terminate a session for these reasons is
clearly based on a concern for avoiding unfairness or even danger to a
vulnerable party-as discussed earlier in the analysis of the Family Code.

Id at Standard VIII.
Id at Standard VIII.A.
172 Id. at Standard
VIII.C.
17 Id at Standard II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-60.
1 Nebraska Standards, supra note 159, at Standard XI.A.
170
171
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In sum, the Nebraska Family Standards, far from offering clear
guidance to mediators, are almost bound to create confusion, by prioritizing
both party self-determination and protection against unfairness, despite the
fact that these two will almost certainly conflict in many cases, like that of
Jose and Lilly.

5.

THE PROBLEMS OF COMBINATION STANDARDS

From the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is clear that
combination standards, while they may try to avoid the exclusivity of
unitary standards, create significant problems themselves. If the purpose of
these combination codes is to accommodate practitioners of both models,
they don't really accomplish this. The slight "room" given for directive
protection by the Model Standards, for example, is not enough to permit
many facilitative practices. And the opposite is true for the N.C.
Standards-the slight room for supporting self-determination given by this
code is not enough to accommodate many transformative practices.
Moreover, as demonstrated by the Nebraska Family Standards and the other
combination codes analyzed above, practitioners of either approach are sure
to be confused by the contradictory provisions contained in a "combination
code" that calls for both protection and self-determination, when the two
"priorities" are likely to conflict in many situations. Indeed, unitary
standards at least have the virtue of clarity and consistency of purpose.
Combination standards, seemingly designed to support more diversity of
practice, wind up confusing practitioners of either approach.

C. A ThirdApproach: PluralisticStandards
The foregoing sections-as well as the earlier analysis of the
Community and Family Codes themselves-illustrate the limitations
and problems of both unitary codes (of either kind) and combination
codes. They are either too narrow or too broad, either exclusionary or
self-contradictory. However, there is a third approach to ethics
regulation for the mediation field, which could address the diversity of
practice in the field more effectively than either unitary or combination
standards. That approach is to recognize that mediation practice today
is pluralistic, and therefore ethics standards should also be pluralistic.176
That is, there are distinct and different models of practice being used by
176

See Waldman, supra note 21, at 765-68.
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mediators today-the most common of which are facilitative and
transformative. Each of these models prioritizes a different valuereaching good solutions that avoid unfairness or supporting party selfdetermination. The role of the mediator, as discussed earlier, is
different in each model. Therefore, the ethical obligations that flow
from this role should be recognized as being different in each model.
No one single set of ethical standards is feasible or appropriate for a
diverse and pluralistic profession. Rather, different ethical standards
should exist for each of the distinct models of practice, allowing
mediators of each approach to practice, but also holding mediators of
each approach to practice ethically within their model. This is the
solution explored in the final Part of this Article.

VI.

A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO MEDIATION ETHICS:
DELIVERING ON MEDIATION'S DIFFERENT PROMISES

In a general sense, ethical practice means delivering on the
promises that the professional makes to his/her client. The contract
between mediator and client, whether explicit or implied by the role the
mediator offers to play, defines what the client has a right to expect of the
mediator. Ethical standards try to ensure that the mediator fulfills those
expectations, delivers on those promises. However, as shown earlier in
Part III of this Article, the promises made are different depending on
whether the mediator follows the facilitative or the transformative
approach to practice. It follows that, in order to ensure that mediators'
promises are fulfilled in practice, ethical standards should also be
different for mediators following the two different approaches. Therefore,
rather than adopting a single set of ethical standards, whether "unitary" or
"combination" as described above, each jurisdiction should have in place
two sets of ethical standards, one applicable to facilitative mediators and
one applicable to transformative mediators. This framework would permit
mediators of both approaches to practice within the jurisdiction, while
providing for each approach a clear and coherent set of guiding and
controlling standards of practice. All mediators would be asked to declare
to their clients, either as a general statement about their practice or at the
beginning of a case, which approach to practice they follow. Their service
to their clients will then be subject to those standards, and deviation from
the chosen standards would be grounds for complaint.
Interestingly, one of the ethics codes analyzed in Part III actually
begins to suggest something of this sort, but without establishing the
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require
different standards to make it workable. The Virginia Standards
mediators to
[D]escribe the mediation process to the
participants. The description of the process
shall include an explanation of the role of
the mediator. The mediator shall also
generally describe his or her style and
approach to mediation. The parties must be
given an opportunity to express their
expectations regarding the conduct of the
mediation process. The parties and mediator
must include in the Agreement to Mediate a
general statement regarding the mediator's
style and approach to mediation to which
the parties have agreed.178
The assumption of this provision is that mediators may in fact follow
different approaches to practice, and that ethical practice requires that they
disclose their approach to the parties at the outset of the case. This
requirement might be the basis for pluralistic standards keyed to the major
approaches to practice. However, the Virginia Standards are a unitary,
protection-based code, and it does not follow up and provide alternative
standards for facilitative and transformative mediators. Nor has any other
jurisdiction as of yet adopted a pluralistic approach. Indeed, this approach
has also received only minor attention in the mediation ethics literature.

A. Mediation Ethics Commentary and the Pluralistic
Framework
Despite plentiful commentary on mediation ethics over many years,
the idea of a pluralistic framework for ethical standards has rarely been
suggested. Instead, the literature has almost always assumed that there can
and should be only one set of standards regulating all mediators, and the
focus has generally been on what those standards should be-whether by
explaining and justifying some existing set of standards, criticizing and
suggesting modifications to existing standards, or proposing an entirely new
set of standards. In any event, the almost universal assumption is that the
standards, however modified or improved, should be singular and apply to all
mediators.
177
178

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
Va. Rules supra note 120, at Standard D.1.
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One eminent scholar-practitioner who has helped to explain the
Model Standards, analyzed earlier in this Article, is Professor Joseph
Stulberg. Beyond his role in authoring the Reporter's Notes that elaborate on
the content and rationale of those Standards, Stulberg has written numerous
articles addressing how questions of substantive justice should be considered
in mediation ethics-an issue that the Model Standards do not directly
address. 17 9 Stulberg's view on this subject, which seems consistent with the
Model Standards, is that justice in mediation is assured by certain core
elements of the process itself, so that the mediator need bear no responsibility
to monitor and assure the justice of the outcome. 80 At the heart of those core
elements, for Stulberg, is party self-determination or autonomy-understood
as an essential and not merely instrumental value. For Stulberg, "[A]
person's capacity to engage in the process of making such decisions,
and to have her choices respected, is essential to her being; one cannot
be a person without making such decisions and assuming
responsibility for their outcome."' Whatever one's view of Stulberg's
argument that meeting fundamental conditions of procedure is the best
guarantee of substantive justice, and that one core condition is party
autonomy, the Model Standards is clearly a code that adopts these viewsthat is, it is a unitary, self-determination-based code. Subscribing to that
code, Stulberg sees no need for ethical provisions encouraging or requiring
mediators to engage in directive problem-solving practices in order to
guarantee justice, and therefore he sees no need for multiple codes or
pluralistic standards to accommodate practitioners of a protective, problemsolving approach. As long as those mediators respect party self-determination
as required by the Model Standards, they are on solid ethical ground and
need no separate ethical guidance.
While Stulberg in effect explains and justifies the Model Standards
(and the views of those who drafted them), another scholar of mediation
ethics has launched an effort to critique the Model Standards and offer an
alternative code that he believes would improve on them. Professor Omer
Shapira has argued that the Model Standards are both over general and
oversimplified, conflating different dilemmas and ethical imperatives that
should be dealt with separately, inadequately defining other dilemmas, and

See Stulberg, supra note 33; Stulberg, supra note 53.
Mediation is "a procedure suitably viewed as one of pure procedural
justice. That leads to the conclusion that party-acceptability of outcomes is, and
should be, the defining feature ofjustice in mediation. Standards independent of
the process are not needed." Stulberg, supra note 33, at 245.
"8 Id. at 230.
179

1so
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omitting still others altogether. 1 82 At the same time he argues that, despite the
existence of multiple models of practice there are core elements common to
all the models, and based on these common elements a single code of ethics
183
Shapira's
can be formulated and applied to all forms of mediation practice.
all
for
base
a
common
for
argument
his
critique of the Model Standards,
product
the
are
code,
revised
mediation "styles," and his own proposal for a
1
of serious deliberation, analysis and drafting. 8 As with Stulberg's view of
fairness, one may differ with Shapira's common-elements theory.'
Nevertheless, it is clear that he believes his Proposed Model Code can
properly guide ethical practice for mediators of all current models, and thus
like Stulberg he does not address the idea of a pluralistic framework for
mediator ethics.
Omer Shapira, A CriticalAssessment of The Model Standards of Conductfor
Mediators (2005): Callfor Reform, 100 MARQUETTE L. REv. 81 (2016).
183 See SHAPIRA, supra note 11, at ch.
3.
184 See id. at ch. 3, app. I (proposed model code of conduct for mediators).
185 In this author's view, there are strengths and limitations to Shapira's argument.
base of professional role-ethics as the proper framework for articulating
theoretical
His
mediation ethics is a sound one, and one which underlies much of the work done on
transformative mediation by this author and others. See Bush, supra note 10. There is
also validity to his argument that there are common elements to the different models of
mediation. However, his further step of arguing that these common elements are a
sufficient basis for a common code of ethics is problematic. Shapira's common elements
are indeed features of the mediation process in all models, but Shapira does not include
as core elements either the goal envisioned for or the value underlying the process in the
different models. It is there that the models differ greatly, and goals and values are
certainly core elements that reflect and shape the mediator's role conception in each
model, and therefore also the ethics that flow from this role conception. These
differences are the main reason that a single code of ethics cannot encompass all the
different models of practice, as this Article argues. A related problematic element in
Shapira's argument relates to the question of prioritizing the different values that may
conflict and pose dilemmas for mediators. Shapira's view, like Waldman's, is that no a
priori ordering of these values is possible, and therefore a "relativist" approach must be
taken that calls on mediators to balances important values-like self-determination and
justice-according to the situation and the mediator's own judgment. If so, as argued
below regarding Waldman's work, then codes of ethics offer no more than statements of
the conflicting values that mediators should be aware of, and ethics becomes a matter of
personal judgment. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. The alternative view, which
underlies the argument of this Article, is that there are indeed default value priorities in
each mediation model-self-determination in the transformative model, and outcome
quality/justice in the facilitative model-and that ethics codes can and should be based
on these value priorities, and thus give clear answers on what to do when important
values conflict.
182
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In sum, in the terms of this Article, Stulberg is satisfied by a well-

drafted unitary self-determination-based code, and Shapira would be satisfied
by a well-drafted combination code. But neither sees the need for a pluralistic
framework with two sets of ethics standards, each applicable to one model of
mediation. These two scholars are joined by others, some of whom focus on
explaining current standards and some on suggesting modifications or
alternatives.186 Very few acknowledge or take seriously the idea that the
diversity of practice in the field calls for and requires diverse ethical
standards.
One exception to this is found in work done by Professor Ellen
Waldman. In her early work, Waldman first of all acknowledged that there
are different models of practice, distinguished by the way in which the
process involves norms-allowing parties to generate their own, educating
parties about extrinsic norms that might guide party choices, or advocating
the use of social norms to decide matters.187 While Waldman's models
differed from the two main models discussed in this Article, her discussion of
the ethics challenges posed by multiple models paralleled the argument
offered in this Article. Thus, she agreed that,
[Most] codes contemplate one set of
principles to be applied in a uniform manner
to all mediation. Unfortunately, each
mediation model places a different weight
and emphasis on the values of fairness,
disputant autonomy, social justice, and selfdetermination. Predictably, the tensions,
both within and among the ethical
guidelines, occur at the points where the
ethical vectors in the [different] mediation
models begin to diverge.' 88
Waldman also recognized that, despite these value differences, code drafters
insist on creating a single code applicable to all mediators, which simply
cannot work: "The effort to construct a code suitable for all manners of
mediation fails because it does not recognize the divergent, and often
competing, dictates which issue from each model. Mediation is not a 'onesize-fits all' process; it cannot be guided by a 'one-size-fits all' code."
Therefore, she argued that,
186 Ronit Zamir, The Disempowering Relationship Between Mediator
Neutralityand JudicialImpartiality: Toward a New Mediation Ethic, 11
PEPPERDINE Disp. RES. J. 467 (2011); See, e.g., Exon, supra note 19.
Waldman, supra note 21.
188 Id. at 765.
189 Id. at
768.
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Replacing our existing theoretical lens with
a multi-tiered prism would allow for the
construction of internally consistent codes,
tailored to fit each of the mediation models.
The codes could straightforwardly
acknowledge that mediators cannot pay
absolute deference to party autonomy while
ensuring that mediated agreements reflect
societal norms and value judgments. Rather,
the codes could specify that mediators are to
give greater weight to disputant autonomy
in the norm-generating model than in the
norm-educating or norm-advocating
processes. Conversely, fairness concerns
and the safeguarding of third party interests
should loom larger in the mediator's
consciousness when she is employing more
norm-based procedures. If both mediator
and disputants are in agreement regarding
the particular mediative approach to be
used, it is unlikely that either value-fairness
or autonomy will be unduly
compromised. 190
In sum, Waldman's argument in 1997 shared many of the elements of the
argument made in this Article and reached a similar conclusion about the
need for a pluralistic framework of ethics standards.
However, for whatever reasons, in her more recent work, including a
major book on mediation ethics, Waldman seems to have given up on this
pluralistic vision, and on authoritative regulation generally, arguing in
essence that mediator ethics cannot be effectively regulated by ethics codes,
whether single-value or combination, but rather must be guided by individual
mediators balancing competing values in particular situations using what she
1
calls "intuitionist ethics."'9 Codes of whatever orientation can be useful in
framing value choices and conflicts, but they cannot be relied upon to answer
190

Id.

supra note 2, at 15-16. The problem of this approach is that there is
no clear standard by which to assess mediators' conduct and hold them accountable:
whatever a mediator does can be justified by his/her own personal sense of ethics.
Stulberg describes and criticizes a similar problem. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative
versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations:Piercingthe GridLock, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
985, 991-92 (1996-1997). See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
191 WALDMAN,
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ethical questions clearly. Instead, mediators can only be asked to have a clear
awareness of the competing values, and then weigh those values deliberately
and make choices based on their personal sense of the right path in a specific
situation.
In the end, Waldman winds up putting less faith in ethics codes than
either Stulberg or Shapira, both of whom believe that a well-crafted code can
indeed be a sound basis for mediator ethics. Nevertheless, none of these
scholars, nor any others of similar stature, seriously consider the possibility
of a pluralistic framework of mediator ethics, as advocated in this Article.
However, precedent for the pluralistic solution can be found in a different but
related field-negotiation ethics.

B. Proposalsfor Pluralism in NegotiationEthics
For some time, the literature on negotiation has recognized, like the
mediation literature, that there are different models of practice being
followed by practitioners today. Although again the definitions differ, most
commentators recognize at least two primary models: traditional, adversary
negotiation aimed at gaining the lion's share of whatever pie is at stake; and
problem-solving negotiation, aimed at generating a "win-win" solution that
expands the pie and meets all side's needs and interests.192 These two models
have both been treated extensively in the literature on negotiation skills and
practice, for lawyers and otherwise. More recently, however, attention has
been given to the implications of a two-model negotiation process for ethical
regulation and standards. In this context, the idea of a pluralistic framework
has actually emerged and generated discussion by serious negotiation
scholars.
One of the most prolific writers on the negotiation process, Professor
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, has done major work to develop the theory and
practice of problem-solving negotiation as an alternative to the traditional
adversarial model, in both legal negotiation and otherwise.193 In her work on
lawyers' ethics in particular she has argued that "the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct [are] still based on an adversarial conception of the
advocate's role [that] is not responsive to the needs, duties, and
responsibilities of one seeking to be a 'non-adversarial' problem-solver," and
that "a different orientation to the client and to the 'adversary' may be
essential in the kind of creative option generation and problem-solving"

192 See, e.g., RISKIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 178-86 (2005).
193 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View ofLegal

Negotiation: The Structure ofProblem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984).
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involved in non-adversarial lawyering.194 That orientation would require
modification of the existing ethical standards that regulate lawyers' behavior
in negotiation, and Menkel-Meadow suggests several principles that could
19
However, she
bring the diversity she advocates to ethics standards.
revisions to its
these
adopt
will
ultimately doubts that the organized bar
essentially adversarial ethics code, and most of her work on ethics focuses on
lawyers who play roles other than the traditional one of negotiator for
clients.

196

By contrast, two other legal negotiation scholars have made
extensive arguments regarding how the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, the authoritative code regulating lawyers' behavior in
negotiation for clients,1 9 7 can and must be revised to accommodate the nonadversarial, problem-solving approach to negotiation, in an essentially
pluralistic ethics system. Both of these scholars propose frameworks that
would take a pluralistic approach to lawyers' ethics, although each proposal
is quite different from the other.
Professor Robert Bordone observes that the negotiation process is
used by lawyers in two very different contexts, and argues that it is and
should be conducted differently in each context.' 98 In one context,
negotiation is actually part of the litigation process, and in that context the
traditional adversarial approach to negotiation is appropriate and indeed
required to serve the client's interests, and the existing Model Rules serve
well. However, Bordone argues, lawyers regularly negotiate for clients to
resolve conflicts out of court, make deals, or act otherwise to solve clients'
194 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38
S. TEX. L. REv. 407, 409-10, 428 (1997).
195 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalismin Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 167-68 (1999-2000).
196 Carrie J, Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, MulticulturalWorld, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 40 (1996) ("I am
skeptical that ethics rules changes can really reform the adversary system.
Adversarialism is so powerful a heuristic and organizing framework for our culture,
that, much like a great whale, it seems to swallow up any effort to modify or
transform it.); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9 (discussing roles for lawyers
outside traditional client representation).

197 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2018),
/

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated 2011 build/professionalrespon
sibilit ,/mod codeprof resp.authcheckdam.pdf.
Robert C. Bordone, Fittingthe Ethics to the Forum: A Proposalfor
Process-EnablingEthical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 14-15 (2005).
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problems, and in all of these non-litigation contexts the lesson of decades of
negotiation research is that the problem-solving approach is far more
appropriate and effective than the adversarial approach, regardless of the
specifics of the situation involved.199
Therefore, he proposes the adoption of a second code of professional
conduct specifically applicable to lawyers serving as negotiators in these
non-litigation-related contexts. That code would require such lawyers to
negotiate as problem-solvers, using what Bordone believes has been proven
to be the superior approach to the process. 2 00 Adversarial negotiation
behaviors would be unethical under this lawyer-negotiator code, even though
they might be perfectly acceptable in litigation-related negotiation. In effect,
Bordone would limit each negotiation approach to what he argues is its
appropriate context. Bordone's pluralistic framework does not envision the
use of both adversarial and problem-solving negotiation as valid alternatives
everywhere, whether inside or beyond the litigation context. Rather his
ethical pluralism is strictly context-based. In one context, ethics rules would
permit adversarial methods-as the current Model Rules do-and in the
other context an entirely new code would permit only problem-solving
practices. Bordone has not proposed a draft of this new code, but its outlines
are implied by the principles of the problem-solving negotiation model, as
well as in other work on collaborative problem-solving. 2 0 1
A significantly different approach is taken by a third negotiation
scholar. Professor Scott Peppet argues for what he calls a "contractarian"
form of ethical pluralism for lawyer negotiators.20 2 By this he means a system
in which lawyer negotiators (and their clients) could agree to be bound by
either of two sets of ethics rules, one directed to the adversarial approach and
the other to the problem-solving approach. 2 03 This commitment could be
made generally - with the lawyer committing to and advertising his/her
approach to all prospective clients - or it could be made on a case by case
basis, again with notice to clients. Based on the commitment made, the

9
2
201

Id at 15-19.
Id at 29-32.
See id. at 15-20; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9; Menkel-Meadow, supra note

193.
202 Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' BargainingEthics, Contract, and
Collaboration:The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of
ProfessionalPluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 475 (2005).
203 Id at 514-25. Peppet contrasts this approach specifically with what he calls the
approach of regulatory uniformity, which assumes that all lawyers should be subject to a
single unitary ethics code. Id at 518-19. In doing so, he explicitly states that his proposal
is "structured around a different foundational assumption: pluralism." Id.
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lawyer's practices would be judged by different ethics rules, adversarial or
collaborative. The choice of approach, and rules, would be available to
lawyers regardless of the "context" of their negotiation practice-related or
unrelated to litigation. Thus, Peppet envisions a truly pluralistic ethical
framework for lawyer negotiators, authorizing lawyers to choose between the
two different models in any context and any case, and then be subject to the
ethics rules they chose.
Moreover, Peppet goes beyond this general idea and begins to
204
suggest what the alternative ethics rules could actually be. In doing this, he
does not draft an entirely new "collaborative" code but builds on the existing
Model Rules. For each of several of the Model Rules that would serve as
defaults, he proposes alternative collaborative language or add-ons that the
lawyer could opt for by formal declaration. Thus, Peppet uses as an example
Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules, regarding "Truthfulness in Statements to
Others." This Rule, together with the official comments on it, is often
offered as a prime example of the adversarial ethics of lawyer
negotiation, allowing a whole range of nondisclosure, puffing and
bluffing. 2 05 Peppet's proposal would join the current adversarial rule to a
new collaborative alternative, and allow lawyers either to retain the
current version or to opt-in and be subject to a different and more
collaborative rule (shown by italics), as follows:
(1) [Rule 4.1(1) would contain the
existing Rule 4.1:]
In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when
disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.
[then add the following [optional
collaborative rules]:]

204

Id. at 522-25.

205 See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 253-71.
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(2) A lawyer may opt for a more
collaborativeengagement with third
persons by so designating, by reference
to this Rule provision, in a written
agreementsigned by all clients and
attorneys involved in a matter, so long
as allparties to the agreementprovide
informed consent. Lawyers practicing
pursuantto thisprovision agree to:
(a) be truthful in all respects regardingthe
matterfor which this section has been
invoked;
(b) disclose all material information needed
to allow the thirdperson in question to
make an informed decision regarding
the matter;
(c) negotiate in goodfaith, i.e., among
other things, abstainingfrom causing
unreasonabledelay andfrom imposing
avoidable hardships on anotherparty
for the purpose ofsecuring a
negotiationadvantage.
(3) A lawyer may further optfor a more
collaborativeengagement with third
persons by so designating, by reference
to this Rule provision, in a written
agreementsigned by all clients and
attorneys involved in a matter, so long
as all partiesto the agreementprovide
informed consent. Lawyers practicing
pursuantto this provision agree to:
(a) refuse to assist in the negotiation of any
settlement or agreement that works
substantialinjustice upon another
party....
[also add to Rule 7.4 (Communication
of Fields of Practice and
Specialization]
(e) A lawyer or law firm may, in
advertisementsor communications,
designate him- or herself or thefirm as
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a "Collaborative"or "ProblemSolving" lawyer orfirm so long as that
lawyer orfirm primarilypractices
subject to the provisions ofRule 4.1(2)
or 4.1(3). 206
Peppet's pluralistic framework would not only allow lawyer negotiators to
choose collaborative rather than adversarial ethics rules, it would allow the
choice of two different levels of collaborative practice. It would also allow
lawyers to switch from one mode to another during a case, if the lawyer
decided that it was appropriate, and the client agreed. And it would allow
lawyers to advertise their chosen mode of practice to clients and to other
lawyers.
Peppet's proposal, and his justifications for it, show that where there
are two different and viable models being used to engage in a certain
professional practice, a pluralistic framework of professional ethics is both
possible and desirable. 2 07 Thus, although this insight has not yet been adopted
by the mediation field, there is good precedent for it in the related field of
negotiation. This Article argues that the time has come to employ the
pluralistic approach to mediator ethics.

C. A PluralisticApproach to MediatorEthics
The argument of this Article is that it is time to recognize the need
for a pluralistic framework for mediator ethics, as the only way to both
support and hold accountable mediators following either of the major
approaches to practice. Professor Peppet's proposal for negotiation ethics
rules demonstrates one way to enact a pluralistic framework (though he has
not shown how it could be applied throughout the lawyers' Model Rules).
However, the path to doing so in mediation ethics is actually much easier,
given the existing environment of multiple ethics standards. As demonstrated
by the earlier analysis of representative mediation ethics codes, the mediation
field has already put in place standards that are appropriate for both models
of practice currently being used. There are unitary self-determination-based
standards like the Community Code, the Model Standards on which it is

See Peppet, supranote 202, at 523-24.
Id. at 514-19 (discussing the primary critiques of the Model Rules-i.e., they
permit non-accountability and partisan professionalism, and demand regulatory
uniformity-and showing that the pluralism proposal avoids or overcomes all of the
critiques).
206
207
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partly based, or other state codes based in turn on the Model Standards.2 08 On
the other hand, there are unitary protection-based-standards, like the ABA
Family Code or the Virginia Code. 2 0 9 Even the codes described above as
"combination codes" are usually oriented heavily toward either protection or
self-determination, and could be rendered unitary with slight editing.2 10
In short, with ample existing material to choose from, little drafting
would be required. A pluralistic ethics framework could be established
relatively easily in any jurisdiction by simply approving one code of each
type-protection- or self-determination-based-and requiring mediators to
declare which code they commit to practicing under, either generally or in
each specific case, as Peppet suggests negotiators could do. That declaration
would establish the ethics code applicable to that mediator (in that or all
cases), and both mediators and clients would know what is expected and
demanded of the mediator and what conduct gives grounds for complaint.
As discussed earlier in this Article, establishing a good framework
for mediator ethics has proven a tough "problem" for the field to solve.
Adopting unitary codes based on either core value-protection or selfdetermination-makes it difficult and risky for mediators whose practice
model is based on the other core value. Adopting combination codes
confronts mediators with the insoluble problem of satisfying both values
even when they are in conflict, which will often be the case. Nor does it seem
wise to regard all ethics standards as merely suggestions and thus delegate to
every individual mediator the task of resolving ethical dilemmas according to
their personal sense of right and wrong, or their ethical intuition-a
"solution" that would mean no consistent ethical regulation at all. 2 11

208

See supra notes 61-100, 127-36 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 46-60 & 101-20 and accompanying
text.
Some examples of editing of codes that would render them more clearly unitary
(of one kind or the other): For example, in the Model Standards, to make them more
clearly unitary and self-determination-based, remove Standard VI.A, which includes
"safety" and "mutual respect"-neither of which is included in the Community Code.
And remove Standard VI.A.4 ("mediator should promote honesty and candor') and edit
Standard VI.A.5 ("mediator may provide information if qualified by training and
experience"). Note also these differences are what make the Community Code a better
choice for a unitary self-determination-based code in a pluralistic system. There are also
possible edits in protection-based codes that would make them more unitary and not
combination.
211 See supra notes 185 & 191 and accompanying text. This would,
in this author's
view, be the worst solution, because it would provide no consistent standard by which to
hold mediators accountable, whatever their model of practice. See Stulberg, supra note
191, at 991-92 (making a similar point that if "facilitative and evaluative" mediators are
held to a single standard, then there is really no standard at all and "anything goes").
209
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By contrast to all of these unsatisfactory solutions, adopting a
pluralistic framework for mediator ethics is both a feasible and a desirable
approach. It would avoid the exclusion of practitioners of either model of
mediation. It would offer practitioners of each model clear and coherent
guidance on how to resolve the major dilemmas they are likely to face in
practice-and especially the dilemma they will find most challenging
whenever it arises, the choice between protecting against injustice or
supporting self-determination. An ethical system that does not provide clear
guidance, especially on that dilemma, does an injustice to both mediators and
their clients, and the system in place until now has allowed that situation to
prevail. With agreement now widespread on the options for mediator practice
and the values underlying those options, it should be possible for the field to
stand up and meet the challenge of establishing clear, consistent ethics rules
by adopting a pluralistic approach to mediation ethics in every jurisdiction
where mediation is practiced.
To return in closing to the case that launched this inquiry, the case of
Jose, Lilly and Rafaela, and the ethical questions raised by the parents'
choice to resolve their disagreement by using a screen to provide privacy for
Rafaela: 212 How would this case be treated under the kind of pluralistic ethics
regime suggested here? In that regime, it can be assumed that two codes of
ethics would exist, corresponding to the two models of practice and their
underlying values, protection and self-determination. Assume those were the
two codes analyzed earlier, in Part IV of this Article-the New York State
Community Code and the ABA Family Code (although the latter would be
expanded to include protections not only for children but for vulnerable
2 13
With both
parties of other kinds, such as the elderly, the disabled, etc.).
codes and both models of practice available, one further element would need
to be present for the pluralistic framework to work: an ethical requirement on
all mediators to inform clients of the approach to mediation that they follow
and the other approach to mediation that could be provided by a different
mediator. This disclosure requirement could be satisfied by a written
statement included in both ethical codes, with a requirement that it be read
and explained to all clients before they engage a mediator's services. The
statement should describe the key elements of each approach to mediation,
the key differences between them, and the advantages and disadvantages of
each-all in plain language. This type of "process option disclosure" is more
and more under consideration as an ethical requirement for lawyers advising
212

See supra text accompanying note 8.

213

See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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clients on dispute resolution options prior to undertaking a representation. 214
If the mediator explaining the options were a facilitative mediator, then Jose
and Lilly could choose either to go ahead with that mediator or ask to be
referred to a colleague who follows the transformative approach-and vice
versa if they'd begun with a transformative mediator. 2 15
This introductory step should satisfy Jose and Lilly that they've
found a mediator who uses the approach they want-either taking a
supportive role that follows and supports (but does not limit or direct) their
communication and decision-making wherever it leads, or taking a protective
role that guides and directs them toward a solution that meets both sides'
(and Rafaela's) needs and is fair and just. When the mediation then proceeds,
using the model chosen by the couple, their mediator is both guided by and
accountable to a code of ethics suited to his/her model of practice. And that
code, whether it is the Community Code or the Family Code, will provide
clear and coherent answers to the questions the mediator faces as Jose and
Lilly discuss and begin to agree on using the screen to afford Rafaela
privacy. Those answers have been identified and explained in the analyses
presented in Part IV of this Article, and they should ensure that the mediator
knows what to do in order to provide the parties the kind of assistance that
they themselves have decided they want.
Ultimately, this is the test of a successful ethics regime: It ensures
that clients receive the service that they believe they want and need, and that
the mediator has promised to provide.2 16 A pluralistic ethics system is the
best guarantee that individual mediators will deliver on their promises to
specific clients. At a larger level, it is also the best guarantee that the
mediation field as a whole will deliver on the different promises it has made
to parties in conflict by permitting and supporting, but also by holding
accountable, mediators following diverse models of practice based on
different underlying values. Both of those models have value, and both
respond to different needs and preferences of parties in conflict. 2 17 A diverse
world of mediation practice is needed to fulfill the different promises the
214

See, e.g., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT r. 2.1 (COLO.
BAR ASS'N 2018);

Donald
A. Burkhardt & Frederic K. Conover, II, The Ethical Duty to Consider Alternatives
to Litigation, 19 COLO. LAw 249, 249 (1990). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 194
(suggesting such process disclosure counselling as one of her principles for
nonadversarial lawyering).
215 The objection is often made by facilitative mediators that transformative
mediators do not inform clients of the facilitative alternative. However, the same is true
in reverse. A disclosure statement would cure this problem for all mediators and clients.
216 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
217 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 1, at ch. 7.
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field holds for disputing parties and for society as a whole. For that diversity
to exist and flourish, ethical standards must be clear, coherent-and
pluralistic. The argument of this Article is that such a pluralistic approach to
mediation ethics is within the field's grasp, and that it should be discussed
and adopted, the sooner the better for mediators, parties, the mediation field,
and society as a whole.
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